

**GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA  
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY (GEF)  
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)**

**INDEPENDENT TERMINAL EVALUATION  
OF THE UNDP COMPONENT OF THE  
CONSERVATION & MANAGEMENT OF THE  
EASTERN ARC MOUNTAIN FORESTS OF TANZANIA  
(CMEAMF) PROJECT**

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Virginia Ravndal, Independent Evaluator & Team Leader  
With inputs from Prof. Kiko Hamza, National Consultant

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## Acronyms

APR	Annual Project Report
ARPIP	Action Research on the Poverty Impacts of PFM – ODI, Ford Foundation
BESWG	Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services Working Group
CBO	Community Based Organization
CEPF	Critical Ecosystems Partnership Fund (CI, WB, GEF, JICA, MacArthur)
CFR	Catchment Forest Reserve
CFP	Catchment Forest Project (NORAD)
CI	Conservation International
CMEAMF	Conservation and Management of the Eastern Arc Mountain Forests
DALDO	District Agriculture and Livestock Development Office
DANIDA	Danish International Development Assistance
DAWASA	Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Authority
DIDC	Department of International Development Cooperation, Finland
DED	District Executive Director
DFO	District Forest Office
DNRO	District Natural Resources Office
EAMCEF	Eastern Arc Mountains Conservation Endowment Fund
FBD	Forestry and Beekeeping Division (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism)
FOPIS	Forest Policy Implementation Support project (GTZ)
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GoT	Government of Tanzania
ICD	Integrated Conservation and Development
IDA	International Development Agency (World Bank)
JFM	Joint Forest Management
LAC	Local Advisory Committee
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEMA	Mpango Endelevu Misitu ya Asili (DANIDA)
MNRT	Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTE	Mid-Term Evaluation
NFP	National Forest Program
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development
NPC	National Project Coordinator
NSGRP	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
PC	Project Coordinator
PDF	Project Development Funds
PEMA	Participatory Environmental Management Project (CARE, TFCG, DANIDA)
PFM	Participatory Forest Management
PIR	Project Implementation Report
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RAS	Regional Administrative Secretary
RTC	Regional Technical Coordinator
SEM	Social and Economic Monitoring
SUA	Sokoine University of Agriculture

TAFORI	Tanzania Forestry Research Institute
TANAPA	Tanzania National Parks Authority
TANESCO	Tanzania Electricity Supply Company
TE	Terminal Evaluation
TET	Terminal Evaluation Team
TFCG	Tanzania Forest Conservation Group
TFCMP	Tanzania Forest Conservation and Management Project
TFSA	Tanzania Forest Service Agency
UMADEP	Uluguru Mountain Agricultural Development Project
UMEMCP	Uluguru Mountains Environmental Management and Conservation Project
UMTCC	Uluguru Mountains Technical Coordination Committee
UN-REDD	United Nations Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
VFR	Village Forest Reserve
VNRC	Village Natural Resources Committee
WB	World Bank
WCST	Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the terminal evaluation of the 6 year and 9 month \$5 million UNDP/GEF “Conservation and Management of the Eastern Arc Mountain Forests” (CMEAMF) project in Tanzania. The project was initially planned as a five year project. It will be operationally closed on June 30, 2010. A separate evaluation of the German-funded aspects of the project (which contributed to in a no-cost extension of the project from its previously revised closing date of December, 2009 to the present one) is planned at that time.

The Project is a joint UNDP/World Bank GEF project which is nationally executed (NEX) by the Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD) of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT).

The Project had its origin in an international conference on the Eastern Arc Mountains (EAMs) organized by the Tanzania Forestry Research Institute (TAFORI) in 1997. Following this conference the FBD of the MNRT developed a proposal for funding to the GEF. Project development funds totaling \$ 214,308 were granted through a PDF A and a PDF B from the GEF to assist in the design of the Project. A successful proposal to the GEF resulted in the \$12 million project which had four main objectives, two of which formed the UNDP/GEF project totaling \$5 million, and two the World Bank/GEF project totaling \$7 million:

**Objective 1:** To bring together multiple stakeholders with interests in Eastern Arc to develop a consensus about how best the biodiversity can be conserved and to elaborate that consensus as a comprehensive and a wide-ranging strategy for the conservation of the Eastern Arc Mountain Forests. (UNDP)

**Objective 2:** To support the implementation of community-based conservation initiatives in priority pilot areas in the Uluguru Mountains and to develop lessons that can be extended to other areas. (UNDP)

**Objective 3:** To support a process of institutional reform that will strengthen the capacity of national institutions to undertake participatory forest biodiversity conservation. (WB)

**Objective 4:** To improve the long-term financial flows for forest biodiversity conservation in the Eastern Arc by developing and implementing a sustainable financing and delivery mechanism. (WB)

The UNDP/GEF part of the project had two main components: 1) the “strategy” component which was to develop a holistic conservation strategy for the entire Eastern Arc Mountains (\$2.14 million) ranging over 12 mountain blocks in Tanzania and including a forested area of approximately 3,500 km<sup>2</sup>, and, 2) a site-based project in the Uluguru Mountains, one of the most important mountain blocks in the EAMs in terms of global biodiversity values. The “Uluguru” component (\$2.86 million) was to support community-based conservation initiatives and to develop lessons which could be extended to other areas in the EAMs, providing a testing ground for the conservation strategy and feedback into the further development of this strategy.

By virtue of where it is focused, the benefits derived from this project are of both **great global and national significance**. The EAMs are internationally recognized as an area with an exceptional concentration of endemic species and an area which Conservation International identified in 1999 as one of the terrestrial biodiversity hotspots of the world most urgently in

need of conservation. The EAMs are also of great national significance, supplying an estimated \$620 million in resources and environmental services for the people of Tanzania. The Uluguru Mountains alone (only one of the 12 mountain blocks included in the EAMs) supply water for almost 25% of the Tanzanian population. Up to 70% of the forests of the EAMs may have already disappeared and are not likely to ever return. The remaining forest still has a chance, a chance which has been significantly improved as a result of this and other projects in the EAMs.

The project was **relevant and timely**. It fit well within the national development and environmental agenda and was in line with national policies and strategies. It also fit well within criteria for GEF support being focused on an area of unquestionable global biodiversity significance which is highly threatened and requires urgent action to conserve.

The **impact** of this 6 year 9 month project according to the impact-indicators and targets described by the project itself (in its two logical frameworks) is described in greater detail in various Tables in the Section of this report describing project results and impacts. Overall, protected area coverage in the EAMs increased by over 500,000 ha from what it was at the beginning of the project, and is likely to increase even more in the near future as a direct result of this project, mainly through upgrading of existing reserves but also through the gazettement of new reserves. Forest coverage in the EAMs continued to decrease, although the *rate* of deforestation also decreased in most (but not all) forest areas where comparative baseline and endline measurements were made. In detail, from 2000 to 2008, on average forest was lost at a rate of 40 ha per year compared to 138 ha per year for woodlands. However, when compared to the period from 1990 to 2000, the rates of forest loss have slightly increased while those for woodland have significantly decreased. Change detection analysis has revealed lower rates of forest loss which falls under reserved land, compared to woodlands, which falls under non-reserved land. Forest condition can be deduced in part by assessing disturbance to forests and by assessing level of key threats to the forests. Disturbance transect data from 17 forests suggest that there was no significant improvement in terms of reduced tree cutting in these areas in 2009 compared with the baseline in 2004, however there was a significant improvement in reduced pole extraction in most of these reserves. The most striking improvement in terms of reduced disturbance was in a private forest reserve (a reserve not included in the project intervention). Repeat surveys in 2004 and 2009 show that key threats have been reduced in all 26 forests where such assessments were conducted. The Threat Reduction Assessment (TRA) index for these forests ranged from 29.2% to 79.8 % (the higher the TRA, the greater the reduction in threats). The greatest reduction in threats was in the private reserve, which, as stated previously was not included in the project. Management effectiveness of forests improved from a mean score of 34.4% at baseline measurement to 47% near project end. Connectivity between forests improved somewhat. The Bunduki gap between North and South Uluguru was closed, and a corridor is now being re-established (although not as wide as would be preferred if relocation efforts had been more successful). Some important gaps between forests still exist (in the East Usambaras and between Kilombero and Uzungwas Scarp Nature Reserves in the Udzungwas) that present significant threats to these forests, but there is good progress being made and grounds for hope that these too will be closed soon. The capacity of a diverse array of stakeholders was enhanced, but may not yet be strong enough to ensure continuity without further support of some kind. Knowledge of the biodiversity found in the EAMs was increased, as was the knowledge of the conservation status of this biodiversity (although much remains to be learned). The full impact of the conservation strategy document developed by the project is still not known, although the Endowment Fund has indicated intent to use it in guiding their decisions on financial support, and there are hopeful (but still very preliminary) signs that Districts will incorporate elements of the strategy into their own District Development Plans. The impact of the effort to have the EAMs declared a World

Heritage Site is still not known as no decision has been taken by UNESCO on the nomination submitted only a few months ago (in January, 2010). Nevertheless, should the nomination be successful, this would help secure the area in terms of a globally important set of protected areas managed for their biodiversity values. Although not attributable entirely to the project, the project clearly had a positive influence on the government's decision to increase funding and staffing of forest and nature reserves, the impact of which is certain to be felt over the coming years.

The project also played an important role in assisting Tanzania in leveraging UN REDD funding and German Government Climate Change Initiative funding (collectively around \$8.8 million), and in helping Tanzania prepare a R-PIN for the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. The project's investment in a comparative carbon study assessing carbon stocks within and outside protected areas, and associated capacity building and advocacy was instrumental in paving the way for Tanzania to become a Quick Start country under the UN REDD programme. Without this investment it is quite likely that Tanzania would not have been invited to join Quick Start. It is noted that UN REDD programme activities and associated REDD activities financed by the Government of Norway will significantly increase the funding available for forest conservation and is expected to improve sector governance—critical to stemming forest loss. This is critical to ensuring the long-term sustainability of conservation efforts spearheaded by the project.

In terms of Tanzania's push towards the devolution of forest management within 'Participatory Forest Management' the project assisted to compile all available data on the impact of the approach on forest condition, livelihoods and governance. A summary paper by Blomley et al, published in *Oryx* in 2008 42(3 ) entitled "Seeing the wood for the trees: an assessment of the impact of participatory forest management on forest condition in Tanzania", presented three case studies comparing forest condition in forests managed using participatory and non-participatory forest management approaches. This indicates that PFM is 'correlated with improving forest condition'. The first case study showed 'increasing basal area and volume of trees per ha over time in miombo woodland and coastal forest habitats under participatory forest management compared with similar forests under state or open access management'. The second case study looked at three coastal forest and sub-montane Eastern Arc forests under participatory forest management. This demonstrated a 'greater number of trees per ha, and mean height and diameter of trees compared to three otherwise similar forests under state management'. The third case study showed that 'cutting in coastal forest and Eastern Arc forests declined over time since initiation in participatory forest management sites.' Key drivers of success and failure in this context include the degree of social cohesion at the village level, degree of leadership, tenure security and distribution of the resources, the design of the institutional arrangement, and the degree of support rendered by the local government authority. Similar work coordinated by the SEMP component of the strategy and written up by Vincent Vyamana and others from CARE, also showed the positive impacts of the PFM approach on forest condition, but also showed some marginal negative impacts of some kinds of PFM on Livelihoods. There was a lack of data to assess impacts on village governance.

The above-described impacts resulted from the conservation strategy component of the project. The Uluguru component also had some important impacts although the coverage in terms of number of villages (15) was small (and far fewer than the originally anticipated number of 32 villages), limiting overall impact. Moreover, because many activities did not begin in earnest on the ground until after the MTE (due to reasons described later in this report) there was not much time to fully develop these activities. The most important impacts of the Uluguru component of the project are that financial and organizational capacity of villagers was enhanced, agricultural

productivity was increased, sustainable land management practices related to agriculture were widely adopted, market links were strengthened (mostly for conventional agricultural produce such as bananas and pineapples but also for the less-conventional *Allanblackia* seeds), and awareness of the importance of the forest was enhanced as was the capacity to enforce forest protection laws and bylaws (through the formation of Village Natural Resource Committees or VNRCs, and patrol teams associated with these).

One *assumes* all this has contributed to decreasing pressure on the Uluguru forests, but this is difficult to know with certainty because the project has not directly assessed this. Rather the project has tried to determine if the wellbeing of villagers was enhanced as a result of the project interventions, reasoning that enhanced wellbeing would result in decreased forest pressure. The data available for the Uluguru Nature Reserve (UNR) suggest that total forest area increased slightly from the baseline measurement of 24,008.59 ha in 2005 to the most current estimate of 24,115.09 ha in 2008. Management effectiveness of the UNR has improved from the baseline measurement of 45.5 % in 2004 and 51 % in 2005, to the most recent METT of 63.9 % in 2009. Spot checking indicates that the number of footpaths (an indicator of disturbance) have decreased by 80% since 2004 (2009 data). In addition, pit sawing sites, traps and snares were not spotted in 2009. Overall, the conservation status of the UNR appears to have improved as a result of increased human and financial resources.

#### Some Constraints Confronted by the TET

The Terminal Evaluation Team (TET) was confronted by some constraints in conducting the evaluation including:

- ✦ a new Project Coordinator who had been on board for only 3 weeks and who very understandably had very little information about the project;
- ✦ the death of two key champions intimately involved in the project, i.e., the second Project Coordinator, the late Mr. Corodius Sawe of the FBD who was PC from 2007 to December 2009, when he passed away, and the late Dr Alan Rodgers, the UNDP/GEF Regional Technical Advisor on Biodiversity who had been very closely involved with the project;
- ✦ lack of a more substantive briefing from UNDP/TZ,
- ✦ a rather poorly planned agenda for the TET (many 15 and 30 minute meetings planned, no accounting for travel time between meetings that were sometimes hours apart, lack of prioritization and sequencing regarding meetings) which required significant time to adjust during the mission; inordinate in-country travel time for the number of days provided for the evaluation;
- ✦ incomplete and sometimes out-of-date documentation provided to the TET which led to some confusion;
- ✦ a logframe for which achieved levels had not been updated since July 2009 and which required that the TET spend time collecting this information and in some cases synthesizing and analyzing data that had been collected but not in such a way as to determine whether targets outlined in the logframe had been achieved.

In addition, the TET was not able to meet with a key informant and stakeholder as the strategy component Technical Adviser's visit to Tanzania did not coincide with that of the TET (arriving the day after the TET concluded its in-country consultations).

## Recommendation Regarding Future UNDP Support to Biodiversity Conservation Initiatives in Tanzania

Although project evaluations should normally steer away from making any recommendations regarding future funding, because this TET was specifically asked by UNDP to provide our thoughts on whether UNDP/TZ should continue to be involved in supporting conservation-related projects or if, given UNDP's efforts to streamline ("do less and do it better"), limited resources would better be spent elsewhere. Although the TET cannot assign relative priority to conservation-related projects compared with other projects UNDP may support, it is abundantly clear that there is a great need for continued support to conservation initiatives in Tanzania and that almost all aspects of development ultimately depend on a sound environment. In the case of Tanzania, national and local revenues and livelihoods earned from forests, wildlife and other natural elements are critically important to its development. The TET believes that biodiversity conservation is a strategic area for UNDP support, and believes that UNDP is well-placed to offer continued support to assist Tanzania with its conservation initiatives.

# **1. INTRODUCTION**

## **1.1 BACKGROUND**

The Project website ([www.easternarc.or.tz](http://www.easternarc.or.tz)) describes the national and global importance and the conservation status of the Eastern Arc Mountains (EAMs) of Tanzania as follows:

“Many thousands of species of plants and animals are found in these forests and nowhere else on earth. This includes at least 100 species of birds, mammals, amphibians and reptiles; at least 800 plants and huge numbers of smaller creatures like butterflies and millipedes. Many of these species are threatened with extinction. The Eastern Arc is recognized internationally as an area with an exceptional concentration of species that occur nowhere else on earth.

The Eastern Arc supplies many resources and environmental services for the people of Tanzania. The total economic value of these resources has been estimated as at least \$620 million.

Agriculture, industry and domestic users depend on the Eastern Arc for their water supply. The Eastern Arc Mountains are the catchment areas for many of the important rivers of eastern Tanzania. The Ruvu River that supplies water to Morogoro, Coast and Dar es Salaam flows from the Uluguru Mountains; the Sigi river that supplies water to Tanga flows from the East Usambara Mountains. Morogoro and Iringa receive most of their water from the Eastern Arc Mountains. The Wami, Kilombero, Little Ruaha and Pangani Rivers also flow from different ranges within the Eastern Arc Mountains and have enormous benefits for rural people and agricultural schemes in the lowlands. At least 25% of Tanzanians depend on the Eastern Arc Mountains for their water supply, and without this the economic future of the country would be in doubt.

Hydroelectric power using water from the Eastern Arc Forests contributes more than 50% of the electricity in Tanzania. This power is essential to economic growth and development of the country. A reliable source of water is crucial to avoid serious power blackouts and shortages, with the major inevitable economic consequences.

The cool and reliable climate in the Eastern Arc allows the cultivation of many food and cash crops, which feed local populations and are exported to towns and cities. Fruits and vegetables exported to Dar es Salaam and other large cities include bananas, apples, pears, peaches, plums, cabbages, potatoes, peas, and other specialist items such as leeks, celery, parsley and strawberries. Food grown in the Eastern Arc and exported to towns makes a major contribution to feeding the people of Tanzania and reducing poverty. Due to fertile soils and sufficient rainfall the Eastern Arc Mountains area is famous for large scale farming of Cash Crops, e.g. Coffee, Tea and Sugarcane estates (Kilombero and Mtibwa Sugar Estates).

The forests and mountains of the Eastern Arc provide an attraction to visiting tourists. Current tourist locations include the South Pare Mountains, Udzungwa Mountains National Park, Amani Nature Reserve in the East Usambaras, Lushoto in the West Usambaras and the area above Morogoro in the Uluguru Mountains. The Eastern Arc is increasingly becoming popular with tourists particularly those with specialist interests in birds and wildlife. The area also offers an unparalleled wilderness experience for the more adventurous visitors.

Estimates suggest that more than 70% of the original forest cover has been destroyed and only about 5,400 sq km of forest remain on the mountains. Most of the forest has been lost in the past 100 years due to conversion to farmland, unsustainable timber harvesting and uncontrolled fires. Conserving these forest habitats is very important for the global community and for the people of Tanzania. Most of the remaining forests are within government forest reserves. These government forest reserves are poorly funded and have few staff, however they provide the mainstay for conservation in the area. Since 1998 local people often supported by civil society organisations have been increasingly involved in the management of the Eastern Arc Forests.”

## **1.2 THE PROJECT**

The Conservation and Management of the Eastern Arc Mountain Forests (CMEAMF) Project was originally a 5-year, \$19.3 million dollar initiative of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania funded in large part by the Global Environment Facility (\$12.3 million) with counterpart co-financing from DANIDA (\$4.5 million) through its “Capacity Building for WCST-Birdlife” project, and in-kind co-financing from the Government of Tanzania amounting to \$2.5 million. The Project is a joint UNDP/World Bank GEF project which is nationally executed (NEX) by the Forest and Beekeeping Division (FBD) of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT).

The Project had its origin in an international conference on the Eastern Arc Mountains organized by the Tanzania Forestry Research Institute (TAFORI) in 1997. Following this conference the FBD of the MNRT developed a proposal for funding to the GEF. Project development funds totaling \$ 214,308 were granted through a PDF A (\$ 21,308) and a PDF B (\$ 190,000) to assist in the design of the Project. A successful proposal to the GEF resulted in the \$12 million project which had four main objectives, two of which formed the UNDP/GEF project totaling \$5 million, and two the World Bank/GEF project totaling \$7 million:

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**Objective3:** To support a process of institutional reform that will strengthen the capacity of national institutions to undertake participatory forest biodiversity conservation. (WB)

**Objective 4:** To improve the long-term financial flows for forest biodiversity conservation in the Eastern Arc by developing and implementing a sustainable financing and delivery mechanism. (WB)

The UNDP/GEF part of the project had two main components: 1) the “strategy” component which was to develop a holistic conservation strategy for the entire Eastern Arc Mountains (\$2.14 million) ranging over 12 mountain blocks in Tanzania and including a forested area of approximately 3,500 km<sup>2</sup>, and, 2) a site-based project in the Uluguru Mountains, one of the

most important mountain blocks in the EAMs in terms of global biodiversity values. The “Uluguru” component (\$2.86 million) was to support community-based conservation initiatives and to develop lessons which could be extended to other areas in the EAMs and was also to provide a testing ground for the conservation strategy and feedback into the further development of this strategy.

The Project was approved as part of the GEF Work Programme in late 2002 and the ProDoc signed in March of the following year 2003. The first disbursement was in September, 2003, the National Project Manager (later referred to as the Project Coordinator of PC) was appointed in January 2004, and the project became fully operational 6 months later in June 2004. CARE, the NGO responsible for the coordination of the Uluguru component of the Project, began field activities in September 2003, four months before the Project Manager was appointed.

The project was integrated into the Tanzania Forest Conservation and Management Project (TFCMP), a \$50.1 million initiative which included \$31.1 million in IDA financing. The TFCMP was the primary financial mechanism for implementing the National Forest Program (NFP).

#### Objective and Expected Outcomes of the Strategy Component of the Project

The objective of the strategy component was “to improve the conservation status of Eastern Arc Mountains through the development and implementation of an integrated conservation strategy for biodiversity conservation and water supply”.

The strategy component had four expected outcomes:

- Outcome 1: Conservation status of Eastern Arc Mountains improved as stakeholders use the Eastern Arc strategy as a framework to guide conservation investments
- Outcome 2: Eastern Arc forest values reflected in National and District priorities and budgets
- Outcome 3: E. Arc Adaptive Monitoring Program contributes to the national monitoring systems
- Outcome 4: Improved support for the conservation of the E. Arc at national and international levels

#### Objective and Expected Outcomes of the Uluguru Component

The objective of the Uluguru component was “to improve forest management and conservation and improve land husbandry practices in the Uluguru mountain forests and adjacent villages implemented by local communities, government authorities and other stakeholders”.

The six expected outcomes of the Uluguru component were:

- Outcome 1: Management and protection systems in the Catchment Forest Reserves (CFRs) are substantially improved, and biodiversity and hydrological values better understood.
- Outcome 2: Joint forest management and other resource use arrangements established
- Outcome 3: Capacity of local communities in sustainable land use

- Outcome 4: Selected opportunities for income generation in the Uluguru mountains developed (emphasizing sustainable use of forest resources)
- Outcome 5: Conservation awareness increased at all levels (through education campaigns politicians, schools, opinion leaders and local communities).
- Outcome 6: Social economic program around the people interface and broader livelihood issues developed and under implementation.

## **1.3 THE EVALUATION MISSION**

### **1.3.1 GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF THE EVALUATION**

According to the TOR for the final project evaluation, "Monitoring and evaluation in the Global Environment Facility (GEF) projects have the following overarching objectives:

- To promote accountability for the achievement of GEF objectives through the assessment of results, effectiveness, processes, and performance of the partners involved in GEF activities. GEF results are monitored and evaluated for their contribution to global environmental benefits.
- To promote learning, feedback, and knowledge sharing on results and lessons learned among the GEF and its partners, as a basis for decision-making on policies, strategies, program management, and projects, and to improve knowledge and performance

The purposes of conducting evaluations includes the understanding of why and the extent to which intended and unintended results are achieved, and their impact on stakeholders. Evaluation is an important source of evidence of the achievement of results and institutional performance, and contributes to knowledge and to organizational learning. Evaluation should serve as an agent of change and play a critical role in supporting accountability.

In accordance, all full and medium-size projects supported by GEF are subject to a final evaluation upon completion of implementation. In addition to providing an independent in-depth review of implementation progress, this type of evaluation is responsive to GEF Councils' decisions on transparency and better access to information during implementation and on completion of a project.

Specifically, the Terminal Evaluation (TE) must provide a comprehensive and systematic account of the performance of a completed project by assessing its project design, process of implementation and results vis-à-vis project objectives endorsed by the GEF including the agreed changes in the objectives during project implementation. TEs have four complementary purposes as follows:

- To promote accountability and transparency, and to assess and disclose levels of project accomplishments;
- To synthesize lessons that may help improve the selection, design and implementation of future GEF activities;

- To provide feedback on issues that are recurrent across the portfolio and need attention, and on improvements regarding previously identified issues; and,
- To contribute to the GEF Evaluation Office databases for aggregation, analysis and reporting on effectiveness of GEF operations in achieving global environmental benefits and on quality of monitoring and evaluation across the GEF system.

### **1.3.2 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES OF THIS TERMINAL EVALUATION & TERMS OF REFERENCE**

According to the TOR for the final evaluation, “This terminal evaluation (TE) is being carried out to provide a comprehensive and systematic account of the performance of the Conservation and Management of the Eastern Arc Mountain Forests, Tanzania project by assessing its project design, the process of implementation and results and outputs vis-à-vis project objectives endorsed by the GEF and other partners (Govt, UNDP, CARE and TFCG) including the agreed changes in the objectives during project implementation. Specifically, the Terminal Evaluation will undertake the following tasks:

- Assess overall performance and review progress towards attaining the project’s objectives and results including relevancy, efficiency and effectiveness of the actions taken given the available funding and capacities for implementation.
- Review and evaluate the extent to which the project outputs and outcomes have been achieved, and the shortcomings in reaching project objectives as stated in the project document.
- Assess the project results and determine the extent to which the project objective was achieved, or is expected to be achieved, and assess if the project has led to any positive or negative consequences.
- Assess the extent at which the project impacts have reached or have the potential to reach the intended beneficiaries; in particular, the balance between conservation and livelihood actions spearheaded through the project.
- To critically analyze the implementation arrangements and identify strengths and weaknesses in the project design and implementation
- Describe the project’s adaptive management strategy – how have project activities changed in response to new conditions, (e.g. recommendations of the MTE) and have the changes been appropriate in particular the issue of capacity;
- Assess the project’s contribution to the GEF Strategic Priority for catalyzing sustainability of Protected Areas (PAs) in particular improving opportunities for sustainable use, benefit sharing and broad stakeholder’s participation among communities.
- Review the clarity of roles and responsibilities of the various agencies and institutions and the level of coordination between relevant players. In particular look at the roles of the Project team, district authorities, and MNRT.
- Assess the level of stakeholder involvement in the project from community to higher Government levels and recommend on whether this involvement has been appropriate to the goals of the project.
- Describe and assess efforts of UNDP (CO and UNDP-GEF) in support of the implementation.

- Review donor partnership processes, and the contribution of co-finance.
- Describe key factors that will require attention in order to improve prospects for sustainability of project results achieved. Assess the likelihood of continuation of project activities/results, outcomes/benefits after completion of GEF funding, considering the “traditional” economic activities in which these communities are involved.
- Identify and document the main successes, challenges and lessons that have emerged in terms of:
  - ✓ Strengthening country ownership, initiative and leadership;
  - ✓ Community level assessment and stakeholder participation at all stages of the project cycle;
  - ✓ Communication approaches and strategies and their impact on behavioral changes and raising awareness at all levels – both in country, regionally and internationally.
  - ✓ Application of adaptive management strategies;
  - ✓ National cooperation, intra governmental cooperation and other project management initiatives
  - ✓ Efforts to secure sustainability; (see the new GEF format for assessment of sustainability)
  - ✓ Role of M&E in project implementation as required by GEF guidelines.

Complete Terms of Reference (TOR) for the evaluation mission are found in Annex 1.

### **1.3.3 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION**

This evaluation is limited to the UNDP part of the larger UNDP/WB GEF project and does not evaluate any aspect of the WB/GEF project except as that project specifically relates to this one. Likewise, the evaluation does not cover the German-funded elements of the project added in 2009, although because of project budget reallocations information which has still not been made available to the TET, it has been difficult for the TET to separate the two.

The scope of this evaluation as per the TOR focuses on three main elements, delivery, implementation and finances. Each element is evaluated using three main criteria: effectiveness, efficiency and timeliness. Assessments are made regarding institutional arrangements, outcomes, results and impacts; partnerships; risk management; monitoring and evaluation; project implementation and project finances.

## **1.4 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY**

### **1.4.1 The Approach Adopted**

The methodology adopted included as a first step the analysis of relevant sources of information such as the project document, inception report, internal monitoring reports, the project mid-term evaluation, project archives, and other background documents that helped inform opinion regarding the project. Following the background documentation review, interviews were used

as an important means of collecting information. Given the large number of stakeholders involved in the project, both individual as well as small focus group meetings were held.

As much as possible, meetings involved only key individuals. An attempt was made to avoid large numbers of participants in single meetings with the exception of the debriefing and several meetings that took place with village natural resource committees, District Council or other member groups. The mission requested that interviewees avoid PowerPoint and other such presentations and were informed that meetings would be informal for the purpose of sharing information, experiences and opinions in an open, honest and forthright manner. As large, formal meetings do not allow for this type of exchange, the TE avoided these to the extent possible. Whenever possible, meetings took place in the field (on site where project activities were undertaken) rather than in offices. The “walk and talk” approach was often used as this helps put people at ease and is usually a very effective means of gathering information from persons unaccustomed to sit-down meetings. On some occasions the Project Coordinator and other project Team members were invited to participate in meetings, but on others the evaluation team requested they not be present.

Although meetings with most Government officials took place in English, many meetings with villagers and others took place in Kiswahili. The TET did not think it appropriate for the national consultant to act as translator, as was suggested by UNDP in the TOR for the evaluation. After discussion, UNDP/Tanzania agreed and alternative arrangements were made for translation.

#### **1.4.2 Documents Reviewed**

Documents reviewed included the project document, project implementation reports (including Annual Progress Reports and Quarterly Progress Reports), audit reports, the Mid-Term Evaluation report and the response to this from the project, monitoring and internal evaluation reports prepared by the project, baseline and other study reports produced by the project, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA), District Development Plans, policies, legislation and regulations regarding land and natural resource management, technical reports and publications produced by the project and others, scientific journal articles. A comprehensive list of documentation reviewed is found in Annex 2.

#### **1.4.3 Consultations Undertaken with Stakeholders**

A list of consultations undertaken with stakeholders during the evaluation mission is attached as Annex 3. The TET visited Dar es Salaam, Morogoro town (where the project office is located), the Regions of Morogoro and Iringa, the Districts of Morogoro Rural, Mvomero, Iringa Rural and Kilolo, and the villages of Bunduki, Nyandira, Udekwa, Vinile nearby to the Uluguru Nature Reserve (Morogoro Region) and finally, the Kilombero Nature Reserve (Iringa Region) over a period of sixteen work days in the country.

Consultations were undertaken with a wide variety of stakeholders including UNDP, project staff, central government, Regional government, District government, village government, villagers nearby to forest and nature reserves, Village Natural Resource Committees (VNRCs), Village Savings and Loan (VS&L) groups, Sustainable Land Management (SLM) groups, paraprofessionals, Community-Based Trainers (CBTs), CARE, WCST, TFCG, the Manager of the Endowment Fund, DANIDA and others.

Following the country visit, the Team Leader of the TET had telephone conferences with the Strategy Technical Advisor.

## 2 FINDINGS: PROJECT DESIGN, REVIEWS AND REVISION

### 2.1 Project Design

#### *The Relevance, Strategy and Scope of the Project (including joint design with WB)*

This section addresses the questions: *Is the project relevant? Was the project timely? Does it represent a strategic intervention? Does it address key threats and critical barriers to conservation? Is the scope of the project appropriate?*

The project was very relevant to the national development and environmental agenda and in line with national policies and strategies including the *National Forest Policy* (1998) and the *Forest Act* (2002). The *National Forest Act* (2002) provides the legal framework for communities to own, manage, or co-manage forests under a variety of management arrangements. The *Forest Act* was developed in part on pilot experiences in the early 1990s (funded by the SIDA) and supports PFM by enabling communities to declare Village or Private Forest Reserves, and allowing them to enter into JFM agreements with Government. According to a comprehensive description of lessons learned and experiences to date regarding PFM in Tanzania (*Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania: Lessons Learned and Experiences to Date*, Sept, 2009), a report commissioned by the FBD and financed by the Danish government and the World Bank, Tanzania was one of the first African countries to formally recognize the role of communities in managing and owning forests. There are now some 2,300 villages and over 4 million ha of forests under PFM arrangements in Tanzania. Although PFM (including JFM) is not a new “model” in Tanzania, a critical consideration in PFM agreements has yet to be sorted out. A key to the success or failure of PFM is benefit-sharing arrangements between the government and participating communities or others. Benefit-sharing guidelines were submitted to the Ministry of Finance for approval several years ago, but have not yet been approved. This is a critical barrier that affects sustainability of project outcomes related to JFM, although sustainability of the one JFM experience supported by this project is questionable for other reasons as well.

In addition to being in line with forest-related policies, the project also fit well within the 1997 *National Environmental Policy*, which aims to ensure “sustainable and equitable use of resources for meeting the basic needs of the present and future generations without degrading the environment or risking health or safety”, “preventing and controlling degradation of land, water, vegetation and air, and “conserving and enhancing our natural and man-made heritage, including the biological diversity of the unique ecosystems”, and with the *National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty* which strives to widen the space for effective participation of civil society, private sector development and fruitful local and external partnerships in development.

The project represented a timely and strategic intervention that addressed some key threats and critical barriers to effective conservation of the EAM forests. The scope of the project was appropriate, if somewhat overly ambitious for the funds and time allocated to achieve what it set out to do.

#### Choice of the Project Area

The choice of the Eastern Arc Mountain forests for a GEF-supported project was excellent. The global significance of the Eastern Arc Mountain forests and the threat to these has been well-

documented. The EAMs were identified by Conservation International in 1999 as one of the terrestrial biodiversity hotspots most urgently in need of conservation. This is one of the smallest and most threatened biodiversity hotspots in the world with one of the highest concentrations of threatened species in the world. Some estimates suggest that 70% of the forest area has already been lost. Urgent attention was therefore required. Political will of the government of Tanzania to conserve these forests existed (and still exists) but limited resources were (and still are) available to do this on their own. All of this adds up to a good choice for GEF support.

The choice of the Ulugurus as a pilot area was sound and strategic. The Ulugurus is one of the 3 most important sites in the EAMs in terms of endemic and threatened species. Whereas, according to Lovett (2005) forest loss seems to have slowed throughout much of the EAMs over the past ten years, probably “because there is little forest left outside the reserves and people have cleared forest up to the boundaries”, the Ulugurus are one of the mountain forest blocks with obvious continued forest loss. Field assessments in 2005 indicated that the loss of forest in this area of village/general land is still continuing and that there is 530 ha of encroachment into the Uluguru South Forest Reserve. The Ulugurus are thus both globally significant and highly threatened and as such these forests were a good choice for the pilot area. Furthermore, the Ulugurus are the source of water for up to 25% of Tanzanians, including those living in major cities such as Dar es Salaam and Morogoro, thus it was a strategic choice both because of its biodiversity importance as well as its easily-understood and recognized importance to people.

#### The Process of Designing the Project including the Problem & Solution Analysis

The process of designing the project was covered in the Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) and therefore will not be readdressed in detail in this report except for to indicate a strong concurrence with the observations of the MTE regarding the process and outcomes of the problem and solution analyses undertaken during project design. The MTE points out that although the design of the Uluguru component was very participatory and country driven, “it is a process based primarily on what stakeholders want to do and is only loosely linked to the problem analysis.” The Terminal Evaluation Team (TET) agrees with the MTE in that the problem analysis could have been stronger. A strong problem analysis including an analysis of the root causes of each key threat is essential to a solid project design. In conducting the problem and solution analysis, use of a “menu” of threats and possible solutions can have detrimental effects and it is usually best avoided. It is also good practice to ensure that a conservation biologist with experience in the use of logframe approach and on-the-ground experience as a project manager be involved in the threats and solutions analysis from the beginning and that it be clear to all stakeholders that although participation is fundamental, the idea is not to include everything that everyone wants in a project but rather to design a strategic intervention that addresses the key threats and critical barriers in the most cost-effective and sustainable way possible.

Several threats were identified by the MTE as having been overlooked, i.e., invasive alien species, firewood cutting, and hunting<sup>1</sup>. These were subsequently given more attention by the project. The MTE also points out that little mention is made of lack of protection and enforcement or lack of incentives for local populations to conserve or protect the forest. In addition to those missed threats and root causes described in the MTE, the TET believes that

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<sup>1</sup> Whereas the project has some activities which are aimed at addressing the threat of hunting of small game,

others including population growth rates in some of the EAM blocks including the Ulugurus, lack of implementation of the relocation policy, and policy/legislative gaps including lack of a legal framework for benefit-sharing in JFM schemes should have also been included.

The issue of population growth rate (especially in the Ulugurus) and its effect on forest conservation and future prospects for sustainable use of forests was somehow recognised in the project but no clear strategy was developed to deal with it, e.g. enhanced educational opportunities for girls, enhanced awareness of the consequence of this growth, including sensitisation of communities regarding the trend of decreasing family farm size over time, community self-assessments regarding the impact of population on natural resources used by them, and so on.

The Tanzanian government has long recognized the impact of population on the EAMs and in 2006 announced that Tsh 9 billion would be allocated for relocation of people. The TET was unable to determine what if anything actually happened with these funds, but project staff were, according to CARE, compelled to approach people living in certain areas (including the Bunduki gap) to ask if they were “ready to relocate”. Certain Districts such as Morogoro Rural made strong attempts “to get the people down from the mountain”, implementing a policy of no new buildings which they hoped would (and will) encourage young people to move elsewhere. In some cases it has had the desired effect, but mostly people remain where they were for lack of viable alternative places to live and the desire to stay put.

Clearly, it is impossible for a single project to address all threats and barriers and the underlying causes of these. Nevertheless, if they are key, the project needs to at least fully recognize them and if it does not address them, encourage government to seek other partners (including in some cases other UN agencies) who can work on those issues as a complement to the project's efforts.

#### A Joint UNDP/WB GEF Undertaking

The design to undertake a joint UNDP/WB/GEF initiative to try to ensure that long-term financial flows for forest biodiversity conservation in the Eastern Arc would be available by developing and implementing a sustainable financing and delivery mechanism and aligning the project with the larger Tanzania Forest Conservation and Management Project (TFCMP) was good.

#### Two sub-projects

In many ways, the project was managed as two separate but related initiatives instead of as a single project with several components. The “conservation strategy” component and the “Uluguru” component had two separate logframes, two separate project implementation teams with a coordinator for each, and separate financial officers. This was not the best approach. There was less coordination between the two and less awareness of the activities of the other as a result.

#### Adequacy of the Project Budget and Time Frame

There were overly ambitious expectations for the budget and time frame assigned for the project. This is considered a design issue because even though the project has no control over the amount of funding it actually gets from the GEF, it is responsible for proposing and justifying a budget which accurately reflects costs and takes into account inflation in those countries where this is a significant issue. The total amount originally requested from the GEF for the

project was \$5 million. This same amount was granted. Government co-financing was originally anticipated to amount to the equivalent of \$ 2.5 million but much more than this was actually provided (although this has not been formally quantified<sup>2</sup>). The project has the opportunity and responsibility to review and reduce its commitments if necessary (within certain parameters) during the inception stage. Although the inception report (Oct, 2004) indicates that some modifications were made at the inception workshop stage, these were presentational (“selecting appropriate phrasing or clarifying sub-elements of outputs”) and did not entail adjustments to ensure expectations were realistic given budget and time frame.

As it turns out, the budget was not adequate to enable full implementation of all planned activities. As a result, the project sought funding from other sources to implement some activities. In other cases, activities were simply not completed or not fully completed. As one example, inadequate budget and time frame affected the extent to which the conservation strategy could be rolled out to the Districts.

### *The Effect of Poor Progress during the First Half of the Project*

Although a 6 year 9 month project should normally have been sufficient time for many of the Uluguru component activities to reach maturity and a stage at which their sustainability should have been well secured, the significant delays during the first three years of the project (explained in greater detail in the MTE and elsewhere in this report) meant that many of these activities, especially in the Uluguru field project sub-component, only began in earnest following the MTE and thus their time frame was more like 3 years instead of almost 7.

## **2.2 Project Revisions & Extensions**

### Extensions

Originally designed as a five-year project, the project was granted two no-cost extensions, the first which extended the project from its initial closing date of September, 2008 to September, 2009, and the second which extended the closing date to 30 June, 2010. The first extension was needed because of delays caused by reasons explained elsewhere in this report including the transfer of the PC to MNRT as the Director. The second extension was required for three main reasons: 1) the reassessment of the baseline had not started early enough for this to be completed (and indeed even with the extension it was still not completed, or in some cases, even initiated), 2) the government wanted to wait to close the project at the same time as the TFCMP ended, and because 3) time was required to implement the German-funded activities which were started toward the end of the project and included in it. Regarding the last, funding from the German Government, approved in November, 2008, allowed for expansion of the workplan for 2009 and involved reallocation of some project funds, work with some new partners and extension of contractual agreements with existing partners.

The TET believes the extension was warranted and the project made fairly good use of it although, in the case of the strategy component, less-than-ideal progress was made regarding reassessment of the baseline in terms of the determination of whether or not targets had been achieved, and in terms of communicating experiences, results and lessons (although good

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<sup>2</sup> It would be important to do so as this is a strong indicator of Government buy-in.

progress was made with sharing data with other conservation organizations)<sup>3</sup>. In the case of the Uluguru component, comparatively more emphasis was given to project end-line assessment (Project End-line Internal Evaluation Report, Jan. 2010) and assessment of impact and lessons from the Information, Education and Communication activities of that component (Development of a case study to demonstrate the impact and lessons learnt from the information, education and communication component of the Uluguru Mountains Environmental Management and Conservation Project, Nov. 2009), but neither is of especially high quality and communicating the experiences, results and lessons to a broad audience has not yet happened.

### Revisions

Revisions were made to both the strategy and Uluguru components of the project. Both logframes (each component had its own logframe) were modified. A summary of changes made to the “Outputs” of the strategy component (as presented in the 2009 APR) follows:

Changed Outcomes	Notes
1. A holistic Eastern Arc Conservation Strategy is developed, approved and under implementation. This strategy addresses the overall Vision for the Eastern Arc Mountain Forests, and is based on individual mountain block strategies and district strategies	Three 3 sub-outputs were agreed: Sub-output 1.1. International, National and District processes required to develop Eastern Arc strategy completed Sub-Output 1.2. Eastern Arc conservation strategy document produced and endorsed in Tanzania  Sub-Output 1.3. Existing reserve network reviewed and relevant international and national designations applied
2. A set of thematic strategies for biodiversity conservation are developed and implemented, through macro frameworks and individual management plan processes	
3. Stronger justification for the conservation of Eastern Arc forests provided, leads to political support and sustainable financing	
4. Adaptive biodiversity monitoring programs are developed and under implementation	
5. A socio-economic monitoring programme around the people-forest interface and broader livelihood issues is developed and under implementation	
6. Information, education and communication strategies (IEC) are developed and implemented	

These outcomes were once again revised and the total number of outcomes reduced to four. The final expected outcomes described in the logframe are:

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<sup>3</sup> Comments received on the draft indicate that more information has been received and summarized following the end of the evaluation visit and will be broadly communicated. As stated previously in this report, evaluations are based on a specific point in time and it is not possible to continuously update reports as new information is made available after the end of an evaluation visit.

- Outcome 1: Conservation status of Eastern Arc Mountains improved as stakeholders use the Eastern Arc strategy as a framework to guide conservation investments
- Outcome 2: Eastern Arc forest values reflected in National and District priorities and budgets
- Outcome 3: E. Arc Adaptive Monitoring Program contributes to the national monitoring systems
- Outcome 4: Improved support for the conservation of the E. Arc at national and international levels

### Objective and Expected Outcomes of the Uluguru Component

The objective remained the same. The expected outcomes of the Uluguru component were originally described as 7 outputs. These were modified in 2007 following the Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) to 6 outcomes which are:

- Outcome 1: Management and protection systems in the Catchment Forest Reserves (CFRs) are substantially improved, and biodiversity and hydrological values better understood.
- Outcome 2: Joint forest management and other resource use arrangements established
- Outcome 3: Capacity of local communities in sustainable land use
- Outcome 4: Selected opportunities for income generation in the Uluguru Mountains developed (emphasizing sustainable use of forest resources)
- Outcome 5: Conservation awareness increased at all levels (through education campaigns politicians, schools, opinion leaders and local communities).
- Outcome 6: Social economic program around the people interface and broader livelihood issues developed and under implementation.

The changes made represent an improvement but additional changes would have been helpful. Outcome 6, for example, is very poorly worded. Its meaning is not clear. Phrases such as “around the people interface” and “broader livelihood issues developed” are vague and should be avoided. Likewise, the wording of Outcome 3 could have been improved by being more specific. “Capacity of communities bordering or nearby to forest reserves in the Uluguru Mountains enhanced in terms of sustainable land management practices related to agricultural production.”

## **3 FINDINGS: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT**

### **3.1 Project Governance**

- ✚ There were gaps in time during which the project had no PC. There was a gap of approximately 4 months without a PC when the first PC left to assume the position of Director, FBD. There was another time gap of approximately the same length after the

sudden death of the second PC in late 2009. Although clearly the second gap was due to unforeseeable circumstances, the government response to ensure this gap was filled should have been more timely. (Project management issue.)

- ✚ There was slow progress during the first three years of the project due to several reasons including the decision of the PC not to employ anyone other than one Technical Advisor for the strategy component. Thus, even though the ProDoc had envisaged contracting a Project Officer and a M&E expert, it was only the PC and the Technical Advisor who worked on the strategy elements. The reasoning of the PC was that he did not want to create a parallel structure but rather insisted that the project be implemented with existing staff. This helps ensure ownership and sustainability as well as capacity building and is considered to be the best approach, but should not compromise the project's ability to achieve its objectives. In the case of this project, this approach may have worked better given a longer project timeframe, but the reality is that the threats to the EAM forests to not allow luxury of time and it may have been a good compromise to contract some additional people to be able to deal with the workload effectively, ensuring that a conventional PIU was not established but rather that these additional people were fully integrated into the FBD. Personality conflicts, which appear to have been resolved after the MTE, also caused significant delays. This is a project management issue which the TET feels should have been addressed by the PC, but when this was not possible, the PMC should have acted to address the problem, doing so well before the MTE. (Project management issue.)
- ✚ The project has in many ways been managed as two separate initiatives (with two separate teams, two separate logframes, housed in two separate buildings) instead of a single project with several components. The TET noticed an obvious “they and us” division between the two teams. The CARE component was managed more in the traditional PIU sense and the impression of the TET is that the PC basically assumed responsibility for the strategy component and left the responsibility for the Uluguru component to CARE even if all project funds were channelled through the government. A more effective arrangement would have been for both components to be under the effective management of the PC, not just formally but in reality. This is a project management issue that the PMC should have been more aware of and addressed early on. (Project management issue.)

### **3.1.1 Project Execution and Implementation**

The project is Nationally-executed (NEX) by the FBD of MNRT. This was an appropriate execution modality choice. To implement the many project activities, FBD partnered with NGOs (both national, including TFCG and WCST, and international, including CARE International); academic institutions (Sokoine University of Agriculture in Morogoro and the University of Dar es Salaam); District Councils and village governments; other projects and complementary initiatives (UMADEP, CEPF), and invited international technical support as needed through the contracting of Technical Advisors.

This is the first NEX project in Tanzania to adopt such a participatory partnership approach and sets an important precedent as well as providing an important experience and lessons. There is already evidence that the model will be replicated, although perhaps not with such diverse partners. The new UNDP/GEF Coastal Forests project which will be Nationally Executed through FBD will also establish partnerships with WWF and others.

The model was not perfect. It took significant time to work out some of the glitches (many project activities did not begin in earnest until after the MTE), but by project end the partnership was working fairly well, although still not perfectly. The main defect being that the project, which has two components, was in many ways managed as two separate projects rather than as a single project with several components.

The choice of CARE as a partner was sound. CARE's experience in Tanzania which is relevant to this project includes Development of Jozani Chwaka Bay National Park; Promotion of Misali Island Conservation Area; Development of Ngezi Mature Forest Reserve management plan and tourism plan; Construction of Ngezi tourism promotion centre; Formation and support of 315 savings and credit groups; and Support of the formation and strengthening of several local NGOs. Although CARE did indeed apply much of this valuable experience to the present project, it is unfortunate that CARE was not able to apply more of the positive experience gained from Jozani in the Ulugurus.

### **3.1.2 The Project Management Committee**

There were 18 members of the PMC. PMC composition included government representation from the MNRT and the FBD, the Vice-President's Office, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, the President's Office on Planning and Economic Empowerment, all 3 Regions (Morogoro, Iringa and Tanga) involved and 2 of the 14 Districts (Morogoro and Muheza) included in the project, two NGOs responsible for implementing numerous project activities (CARE and TFCG), the Executive Director of the Endowment Fund, the Tanzania Electrical Supply Company (TANESCO), and 2 representatives from UNDP. The PC and/or the strategy component Technical Advisor acted as the Secretariat for the PMC. Thus, the PMC included broad representation from key central government entities, Regional and District representation, representation of the partner WB/GEF project, and representation of NGOs. The TET view is that this composition was appropriate and would only add that consideration could have also been given to including a "non-interested" party with an independent perspective with a good overview of conservation issues in the country and a solid knowledge of the EAMs to complement the other PMC members providing an independent outsider (outside of the stakeholders more immediately involved in the project) perspective.

Although other UNDP projects in Tanzania have included local-level government participation on their PMCs, this has been strictly through the office of the Regional Administrative Secretary (RAS) which has only indirectly represented Districts. This is the first UNDP-supported project in Tanzania to involve District representation on the PMC. By involving both Regional and District levels on the PMC, these were not only able to keep more up-to-date on what was happening in the project, but their buy-in was greater. As a result, prospects for incorporating elements of the conservation strategy into their District Development plans are also enhanced.

Having a PMC comprised of this many people (from across the entire EAMs) also has its drawbacks. Cost is higher and logistics are more difficult. Perhaps this is one reason why the PMC chose to meet less frequently than most (although as will be noted later, this was not the best decision in the view of the TET).

As of the time of this evaluation (not counting the meeting held during the mission for the purpose of allowing the TET to present its preliminary findings), the PMC had met only seven times. The meetings seem to have been held fairly regularly (about every 7 to 9 months) for the first three years (July 2004, February 2005, December 2005, July 2006, February 2007,

November 2007), but then there was a gap of 21 months (almost 2 years) until the next meeting at the end of August 2009.

It is normal for project steering committees to meet twice a year, and indeed the ProDoc stipulates that this would be the case for this project. UNDP/TZ acknowledged that this PMC had met less frequently than that for other projects, indicating that they would call meetings in the event of any “hiccups”. The TET considers that a more regular schedule over the entire project time span would have been beneficial, and that it would have been especially helpful for the PMC to meet directly following the death of the second PC to encourage the government to appoint another PC without delay and to ensure the project team had a clear course of action until project end, including the need to adequately prepare for the TE, to ensure that baselines were being reassessed and progress on indicators compared with targets that had been set by the project. Just as the first six months of a project are critical to its success, so are the last 6 months. During this critical time the project could have benefitted from greater direction from the PMC.

### **3.1.3 Technical and Coordinating Committees**

The *Uluguru Mountains Technical Coordinating Committee* was intended to be a coordinating mechanism for NGOs which worked in communities adjacent to the former Uluguru North and South Forest Reserves (now the Uluguru Nature Reserve). The composition of the Committee consisted of all the project partners including District Executive directors, District Natural Resources Officers, District Agricultural Development Officers from Morogoro and Mvomero districts, UMADEP, RCFP and TFCG. TAFORI and SUA were to provide technical advice to the projects being implemented by the two NGOs. The committee met on a quarterly basis from 2004 to 2006. Facilitation of meetings alternated between CARE/TZ and WCST. The committee ceased functioning after 2006 due to poor coordination arrangements between the CARE and WCST.

### **3.1.4 Partnerships and Collaborations**

In addition to the positive aspect of the partnership approach adopted by the project outlined above, another positive aspect was the associations formed with other organizations working on conservation issues *outside* the project. An MOU signed with CEPF, for example, allowed the project to plan some actions in collaboration with that \$7 million investment for the Eastern Arc and lowland forests in Kenya and Tanzania, agreeing on how to share resources and get the best value for money from surveys, monitoring, and field conservation projects. This resulted in a lot of synergy.

The same is also broadly true of the work with the EAMCEF, where partnerships and synergies between the two benefitted both and enhanced the long-term existence of the EAMCEF (buildings maintained, web site developed, data collected for library, comments and input to EAMCEF documents).

Another good model was the outreach effort made by the project to other “partners” to try to secure additional funding during the project life to complement and sometimes amplify its own efforts. In addition to the agreement with CEPF, the project was instrumental in raising both government funds for compensation related to relocating people and raising external funds via WCST from the World Land Trust for reforestation in the Bunduki corridor. It also helped raise

around US\$ 3 million for compensation payments and for the undertaking of the relocation process in the Derema corridor in the East Usambaras (successfully reaching out to the EU, the Global Conservation Fund, the Government of Finland, the World Bank and the CEPF through WWF). These efforts will help reconnect forests in key mountain blocks of the EAMs. Finally, the project's work was also used in the development of the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Fund R-PIN and UN REDD national joint programmes for Tanzania.

### **3.1.5 UNDP Support to the Project**

- ✚ UNDP/TZ provided important capacity building/support to the FBD Accountant.
- ✚ UNDP/TZ provided office space as necessary for the Technical Advisors in Dar.
- ✚ The UNDP/GEF TA on biodiversity, the late Dr. Alan Rodgers, provided important substantive support to the project through several visits to the project from the beginning until his death in 2009. As one example, when the project had difficulties understanding the landscape approach, the TA came to Tanzania and held a meeting on the subject to ensure all involved were clear and comfortable with the concept.
- ✚ The UNDP/GEF RTA on biodiversity informing the UNDP CO about the German CC initiative and facilitating contact with that initiative. He helped to identify an expert on carbon measurements and provided important inputs to help finalize the proposal which resulted in the German-funding that allowed for the project's extension and expansion.
- ✚ More support might have been offered to the project by the PMC following the death of the second PC to ensure there would be no significant gap without a PC and to ensure that all involved understood needs related to upcoming project closure (analyzing and synthesizing data collected to be able to assess and present the endline situation, prepare for the TE, amongst other things). Just as project start-up and inception are critical stages of a project, so is project closing. This is normally when the only formal impact assessment is made of projects (even though it would be well to measure impact a few years after project closure as well). This is when lessons can be distilled from the project experiences and this is an important time to share information and experiences.

### **3.2 Financial Management**

Financial management of the project was satisfactory although the funding available as well as some disbursement delays limited full implementation of some activities. The project was audited annually. Audits indicated a few problems which appear to have been subsequently and efficiently resolved. The support provided by UNDP/Tanzania to the FBD finance officer for the project was helpful and indeed critical.

According to accounting procedures, funds can only be disbursed fully if the partner has accounted for the previous disbursed amount. Otherwise the requested amount is disbursed less the amount which is not accounted for. CARE was able to spend about 99.7 % of all the budgeted funds, i.e. TSh 676,549,826 out of 678,815,729. For the strategy component, some funds disbursement delays were caused by the absence of the former PC when Dr. Kilahama was appointed Director of FBD.



### 3.3 Stakeholder participation in project implementation

As described in other sections, stakeholders, including central government, regional and district government, village government, villagers and NGOs, participated fully in all aspects of project design and implementation.

### 3.4 Monitoring & Evaluation

Monitoring of the project is the joint responsibility of the Executing Agency for the project (FBD), the GEF Implementing Agency (in this case UNDP), and the PMC. In concordance with standard arrangements for all full-size UNDP/GEF projects, Annual Performance Reports (APRs)/Project Implementation Reviews (PIRs) were done annually, Quarterly Progress Reports (QPRs) were prepared, an independent Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) was conducted about mid-way through the project (with project extensions this turned out to be less than mid-way, but this was appropriately planned), and a Terminal Evaluation (TE) was conducted in April, 2010, 2 months before official project end.

#### The Baseline & Endline Situations

A lot was done early on in the project to assess and describe the baseline situation, and much of that data has been published and made available to conservationists and policy makers in Tanzania and globally. Following the submission of the draft evaluation report and the conclusion of the evaluation visit, the Technical Advisor to the Strategy component worked with the project team to provide the data and analysis required to respond to the section in the draft report which indicated that a similarly strong effort to assess and describe the endline situation had not been made. The draft report also stated that, "It is important that statistical analysis be done on data collected. If statistical tests had been performed for the differences between 2004 and 2009 for disturbance, threat reduction and METT scores, it would have been possible to determine whether various aspects related to forest conservation had improved or not, and hence whether the projects interventions had a positive impact. Oddly, instead of pooling all the data from 2004 and from 2009 from matched forests to test if there was an overall improvement or worsening of condition, threats and METT scores, the study merely analyzed the data in terms of different management regimes (privately owned forest, central government owned forest and village owned forest). Although this is interesting information, it is not the core information required to enable understanding the result of the project interventions.

For accountability to the GEF and others, it is important that a project monitor its progress up until the very end. It is also important to understand the endline situation to ensure that as part of a project's communication strategy this information can be widely shared with interested stakeholders. The TET had to compile this latest information from the project team as it was not always up-to-date (the latest QPR being from Oct-Dec 2009). Moreover, although data was usually available, more emphasis should have been placed on ensuring that the data were not only collected but also synthesized and analyzed in such a way as to enable determining whether targets set by the project (in the logframes) were achieved or not. It is not normally the job of the TET to synthesize and analyze or even compile this data, but because much of this had not been prepared by the project prior to the TE mission, the TET made an effort to do what it could in this regard. The TET was in contact with both the Technical Advisor and the CARE team who helped provide necessary information."

The information presented below comes from new information provided by the Technical Advisor in response to the draft report. This information has been included in this final version of the evaluation report because it is considered relevant and important, and does address some of the earlier concerns raised. Nevertheless, the original comments are also retained because evaluations are based on a specific point in time. It is not possible or reasonable to expect that reports can be continuously revised as new information becomes available after the conclusion of an evaluation visit.

Although not all information had been analyzed or synthesized at the time of the evaluation mission, the strategy component ultimately did produce endline surveys for a number of impact indicators, for example on protected area growth, forest area changes, forest disturbance changes, threats reduced, reserve management effectiveness score (METT) changes, and staffing and budget changes across the Eastern Arc region.

The reports indicate that in terms of changes in protected area upgrading the following was achieved: Five forest reserves in the EAMs (covering a total area of 178,503 ha) were upgraded to the status of Nature Reserves. These are Uluguru NR, Kilombero NR, Nilo NR, and Rungwe NR. An additional 4 forest reserves (Chome, Magamba, Mkingu, Uzungwa Scarp), covering a total area of 63,552 ha are in various stages (mostly advanced stages) are in the process of being gazetted as Nature Reserves. In addition, 65 forest reserves were classified according to the IUCN protected area classification system and these were subsequently accepted by UNEP-WCMC and added into the World PA database. The nomination dossier to nominate the EAMs as a World Heritage Site was submitted to UNESCO in January, 2010. If successful, this would enhance the legal protection status of an additional 500,000 ha.

In terms of new protected areas, 4,124 ha within 4 new FRs were gazetted. A corridor of 106 Ha was also added to the Uluguru Nature Reserve. In terms of reserve gazetment in progress, the following is underway: the Dererma proposed FR (981 ha) in East Usambara is at an advanced stage in the process of gazetment. The proposal is now with the Permanent Secretary of the MNRT. The proposed Kitemele FR in Kilolo District is at an advanced stage in the gazetment process and is currently with the MNRT lawyer for review. The proposed Kitonga FR, a large reserve at 10,000 ha (Iringa) is under process for gazetment. Work has entailed relocating people who had encroached into the area; this has been completed and the gazetment proposal is now with FBD. The proposed amalgamation of Segoma/Kwamgumi/Bamba/Kwamtili into a single expanded FR (c.3000 ha) has had its boundaries surveyed and a revised map is prepared. The gazetment process is at an advanced stage and is now with the Permanent Secretary of the MNRT. If all the proposed reserves in process are gazetted, an additional c.15,000 ha will be added to the reserved estate within the Eastern Arc Mountains.

When the calculated (2000s – 2008/07) forest and woodland annual degradation rates were compared to those recorded between 1990s and 2000s (FBD, 2006), the results (Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 3.2 and 3.3) showed that overall, the rates of forest loss have slightly increased, while those for woodland have significantly decreased. The observation that the period between 2000s and 2008 has far less woodland degradation may be explained by the fact that woodland areas outside the reserves were already depleted in these Mountains. Furthermore, the results showed that the East Usambara, Ukaguru and South Nguru Mountain blocks have experienced an increase in degradation rates for both forest and woodland, while the South Pare and Udzungwa Mountain blocks have experienced an increase in forest degradation rates and decrease in woodland degradation rates. The other Mountain blocks have shown a decrease in both forest and woodland degradation rates.

**Table 1:** A comparison between rate of change for natural forest between 2000s - 2007/08 and 1990s – 2000s

No.	Mountain block	2000s-2007/08		1990s-2000s	
		% change	Rate of change	% change	Rate of change
1	North Pare	-0.2	-0.02	0.0	0.0
2	South Pare	-2.0	-0.2	-0.1	0.0
3	West Usambara	0	0	-0.7	-0.1
4	East Usambara	-3.7	-0.9	-1.0	-0.1
5	North Nguru	0	0	-0.1	0.0
6	South Nguru	-0.3	-0.1	-0.4	0.0
7	Rubeho	-0.1	-0.01	-0.6	-0.1
8	Ukaguru	-6.0	-0.8	-0.2	0.1
9	Uluguru	-0.30	-0.04	-3.0	-0.3
10	Mahenge	0	0	-5.4	-0.3
11	Udzungwa	-0.5	-0.06	-0.1	0
12	Malundwe	0	0	0	0
<b>Average</b>		<b>-1.1</b>	<b>-0.2</b>	<b>-1.0</b>	<b>-0.1</b>

**Table 2:** A comparison between rate of change for woodland between 2000s - 2007/08 and 1990s – 2000s

No.	Mountain block	2000s-2007/08		1990s-2000s	
		% change	Rate of change	% change	Rate of change
1	North Pare	-0.1	-0.01	8.9	-0.7
2	South Pare	0	0	-16.1	-1.3
3	West Usambara	0	0	-39.6	-3.3
4	East Usambara	-22.2	-5.5	-49.8	-2.9
5	North Nguru	-0.14	-0.02	-8.9	-1.1
6	South Nguru	-2.7	-0.5	-1.9	-0.2
7	Rubeho	-2	-0.3	-32.8	-3.6
8	Ukaguru	-5.0	-0.7	-2.1	-0.2
9	Uluguru	0	0	-8.0	-0.9
10	Mahenge	-0.2	-0.03	-26.0	-1.3
11	Udzungwa	-0.5	-0.06	-5.5	0
12	Malundwe	0	0	-5.8	-0.6
<b>Average</b>		<b>-2.8</b>	<b>-0.6</b>	<b>-15.7</b>	<b>-1.3</b>

The results from statistical tests showed that the rate of forest loss between 2000 and 2008 is not statistically slower than that observed between 1990 and 2000 (Table 5a). The decrease of

woodland loss in 2000 – 2008 is, however, significantly slower than that observed in the 1990 – 2000 period (Table 5b).

**Table 3:** Statistical test of the overall forest loss between 1990-2000 and 2000-2008

	Mean rate of forest loss (%)
1990s – 2000s	0.52 a
2000s - 2008	1.09 a

Means followed by a different letter in the same column are significantly different ( $\alpha = 0.05$ )

**Table 4:** Statistical test of the overall woodland loss between 1990-2000 and 2000-2008

Change detection window	Mean rate of woodland loss (%)
1990s–2000s	15.94 a
2000s - 2008	2.74 b

Means followed by a different letter in the same column are significantly different ( $\alpha = 0.05$ )

An endline survey for forest disturbance (Madoffe and Munishi 2010) shows that the overall number of cut trees and poles for most of the 17 forests resurveyed was lower in 2009 than in 2004. Nine forests experienced higher number of tree cut in 2004 than in 2009, six forests had higher tree cut in 2009 and no changes were recorded for two forests. Furthermore, there was no significant differences between the current data and the 2004 data ( $t = 1.49$ ,  $t$  Critical = 1.75 and  $p < 0.076$ ). On the other hand, 13 forest reserves experienced higher pole extraction in 2004 than in 2009, while four had higher poles extraction in 2009 than 2004. Statistically, there was significant differences between the 2009 data and that obtained in 2004 ( $t = 2.11$ ,  $t$  Critical = 1.75 and  $p > 0.025$ ).

A similar endline survey (Madoffe and Munishi 2010) that compared TRA% figures for 2004 and 2009, showed that most forests (12 of 17 surveyed) had higher TRA% values (i.e. less threatened) in 2009 than 2004. However, despite this positive trend, there was no significant differences in threat between the two assessments ( $t = 1.33$ ,  $t$  Critical = 1.75 and  $p > 0.10$ ).

Endline results from the management effectiveness tracking tool (Madoffe and Munishi 2010) indicate that in 2009 most forests (13 out of 17) scored between 31% and 45%. Furthermore, overall, 12 out of 17 forests had higher ME in 2009 than 2004. In spite of this improvement there was no significant differences ( $t = -2.60$ ,  $t$  Critical = 1.75 and  $p = 0.010$ ) between 2004 data and the current data. The forests with less than at least 45% ME indicated that they are not properly managed hence; they stand a chance of losing their status (biodiversity conservation and catchment values). Similar to previous study, Mazumbai and Ambangulu forests (privately owned) maintained ME score of over 50% due to their good management (MNRT, 2005). On the other hand, the ME for Nilo Nature Reserve increased from 44% in the previous to 53%. This improvement could be a result of elevating its status from a Forest reserve to a Nature reserve in 2007. On the contrary, Nambinga FR (CGFR) with ME score of 30% was designated poorly managed (15%–30%). Furthermore, for the past five years there was no forest falling in the very poor (<15%) category.

In terms of staffing and budgets, since the project began, there are 93 new foresters employed in the Nature Reserves. A total of 200 new Assistant Foresters were employed by FBD and 153 more will be added next year (for both forest and wildlife). Staffing in Nature Reserves has

increased by 472 % from a total of 25 staff for all NRs<sup>4</sup> at the beginning of the project to the current total of 118. There was a comparable increase in the budget provided by central government to the management of Nature Reserves, with further increases planned. Compiled data for other categories of reserves across the Eastern Arc are not available, and hence it is not possible to assess if the impressive positive changes in staffing and budgets are also seen elsewhere. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that this is not really the case and that changes are more modest, although generally positive, in district natural resource offices across the region.

The Uluguru component prepared a “Project End-Line Internal Evaluation Report”, a draft of which was available at the time of the evaluation mission. According to the report, “the purpose of the study was to acquire in-depth understanding of the poverty impacts of UMEMCP as a typical conventional Integrated Conservation and Development Project...”. The study is based on surveys done in 4 villages (the number of households interviewed/surveyed is not indicated). The study indicates that “results showed a slight increase in proportion of rich and significant increase in medium income households from 4.1% before the project to 9.5% after the project and 18.2% before the project to 35.5% after the project, respectively. On the other hand, the proportion of the poor households decreased from 77.7% before the project to 55.0% after the project. This indicates an overall improvement in well-being of these communities. Those who reported an improvement in well-being were followed up as key informant to establish the reasons for these changes. They confirmed that these changes were due to UMEMCP interventions”. The report then continues on to quote 2 villagers who indicate that their well-being has been improved as a direct result of the project, both indicating that they were able to construct “new improved” houses. The report then indicates that “further household survey investigated changes in land holding as one of the indicators of wealth. Results showed that 18% of respondents had bought agricultural land after the project. When asked the sources for the money used to buy land the majority (58%) reported selling agricultural products and livestock, 19% from loans from VS&L, 12% from money from small businesses. The report then concludes that, “Since all the major reasons for the observed changes are attributable to UMEMCP it is clear that UMEMCP is the major cause for the observed improvement in well-being in communities studied.”

There are weaknesses with this study which make the results less than convincing. Although we know the sample size is 4 villages (out of 15 in which the project worked), we do not know how many households were surveyed/interviewed. There is no statistical analysis of the data collected. Although the study attributes enhanced well-being to the project intervention, this is not as clear and simple as the study indicates. Whether or not the conclusions of the well-being study are valid, the bigger question of concern for this terminal evaluation is whether or not the project interventions led to improved forest management and conservation. This, the critical question for this project, is not addressed in the end-line report prepared by the project. Even if the project did enhance sustainable land management in agricultural fields, even if it did enhance agricultural productivity, even if it did enhance overall well-being of some people in certain villages, even if it did enhance awareness about the importance of the forest, the big question, the real question of interest, is did these and/or other project interventions work to significantly relieve pressure on the forest? Although the Uluguru monitoring did not involve monitoring of the impacts on their activities on the forests, certain measurements *were* made during the early stages of the project and again closer to the endline of certain parameters of

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<sup>4</sup> In those cases where what are now classified as Nature Reserves were CFR or other types of forest reserves, the figures relate to staffing in those areas in 2004.

health of the Uluguru Nature Reserve and of the Nyandinduma production forest reserve that permit some conclusions to be drawn (See section on project impact).

### The Logical Framework Matrix and Outcome Indicators

Two logframes were used by the project to monitor its progress regarding the indicators specified, one for the strategy component and one for the Uluguru component. Altogether there were 2 project objectives, 10 expected outcomes, and 46 indicators associated with these.

Many indicators in the logframe specified a time frame of 2008 (the original ending year of the project). Indicators should not normally have time frames attached to them. Time frames should be specified in targets.

The fact that numerous indicators were not being monitored in terms of the progress made toward the target is a weakness in the use of the logframe and in the implementation of the monitoring strategy. Several factors contributed to this situation: the decision not to hire an M&E expert (even though this was included in the original project plan), inadequate budget to implement all project activities as originally planned (thus some monitoring activities were not fully funded), and inadequate oversight by the PMC which, in the opinion of the TET, should have placed greater emphasis on the need to monitor for progress in relation to the specified targets during the last months of the project.

The logframe should be used as a tool for adaptive management. As described in an earlier section of this report, both logframes were revised during the project, with the most substantive revisions being those associated with the Uluguru component following the MTE. To be an effective tool for adaptive management, however, the indicators used in the logframe must be impact-oriented, and must together accurately “add up” to the project objective, i.e., if all indicators are achieved (at specified target levels), the project objective should be achieved. Although this is generally the case for the strategy component logframe, it is less so for the Uluguru component. The TET concurs with the comment received on the draft report that “impacts are frequently longer term than the project duration”, but would also like to emphasize that targets that can realistically be achieved during the project should accompany impact-oriented indicators even if the full impact will continue to be realized well after project end.

The objective of the Uluguru component was “to improve forest management and conservation and improve land husbandry practices in the Uluguru mountain forests and adjacent villages implemented by local communities, government authorities and other stakeholders”. Did the expected outcomes, even if all had been fully achieved, really add up to this result? There is no doubt that they would indeed add up to “improved land husbandry practices” (the second part of the objective), but whether or not they add up to “improved forest management and conservation in the Uluguru mountain forests” is another question which is addressed further in Section 4 of this report.

## 4 FINDINGS: RESULTS AND IMPACTS

### 4.1 Results Achieved

#### 4.1.1 The Project Objectives

##### The Conservation Strategy Component Objective

For the strategy component, the stated objective was “conservation status of Eastern Arc Mountains improved through the development and implementation of an integrated conservation strategy for biodiversity conservation and water supply”. To measure progress towards the objective, the project identified 6 indicators. The table which follows lists these indicators along with the progress achieved to date and the comments of the TET. Because the latest progress report did not reflect actual progress as of the time of the evaluation, the TET made an effort to gather and update this information (presented below).

Table 5: Results Achieved Regarding the Strategy Component Objective

<p>Indicator #1</p> <p>Rates of annual forest loss over the 2004-2008 period declines by at least 10% when compared to the 1990-2004 baseline.</p>	<p>The target set by the project was “10% reduction in rate of loss”. This target has been achieved<sup>5</sup>.</p> <p>According to SUA, the rate of annual forest loss since 2004 until now has declined by at least 10% when compared to the 1990-2004 baseline. Annual average percent forest loss for 1990/2000 was 15.7% while for 2007/2008 it was only 2.8%. Forest is still being lost in the EAMs, but in general at a decreasing rate.</p> <p>The change in rate of forest loss from 1990-2000 to 2007/2008 for various forest and Nature Reserves is:</p> <p>8.9 to 0.1 in North Pare  16.1 to 0 in South Pare  39.6 to 0 in West Usambara  49.8 to 22.2 in East Usambara  8.9 to 0.14 in North Nguru  1.9 to 2.7 in South Nguru  32.8 to 2.0 in Rubeho  2.1 to 5.0 in Ukaguru  8.0 to 0.0 in Uluguru  26.0 to 0.2 in Mahenge  5.5 to 0.5 in Udzungwa</p>	<p>There was only one reassessment done in 2007/2008.</p>
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<sup>5</sup> Outcome ratings are assigned a value according to the TOR for this evaluation of either, Highly Satisfactory (HS), Satisfactory (S), Moderately Satisfactory (MS), Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU), Unsatisfactory (U) or Highly Unsatisfactory (HU). The extent to which the targets associated with the indicators have been achieved is also rated but using a different system. This additional rating has been assigned because of the need to specify cases where further analysis is required to be able to make the determination or where no data is available to make the determination. The ratings are: A=Achieved; A+= Surpassed the target; N=Not Achieved; RFA= Requires further analysis. Data was collected but not analyzed and synthesized in such a way as to be able to readily make a determination of whether target levels were achieved; NDA = No data available to make this determination.

<p>Indicator #2</p> <p>By 2008, results of forest disturbance transects and threat reduction assessments (TRA methodology) across 20 key forest reserves (covering at least 100,000 ha) show reduction of key threats (fire, encroachment, timber harvesting) compared to 2004 baseline.</p>	<p>5.8 to 0.0 in Malunde</p> <p>The target set by the project was "reduction in key threats".</p> <p>The overall Threat Reduction Assessment (TRA) index ranged from 26.35 for Kitonga to 71.4 for Ambangulu – a private forest. Fourteen forests have TRAs ranging between 30 and 39%, five have between 40 and 50% , five below 30% and only two have TRA above 50% (the higher the TRA the lower the threat and vice versa). The current TRA percentage for the three categories of forests was slightly higher than those recorded in 2004, and nine out of 17 forests had higher TRA rates than those recorded in 2004.</p> <p>Disturbance transect data suggest that Key threats have been reduced in all 26 forests where re-assessments were conducted in 2004 and 2009. In more detail, nine forests experienced higher number of tree cut in 2004 than in 2009. In spite of that there was no significant difference between tree cut in 2004 and 2009. Conversely, 13 forest reserves experienced higher pole extraction in 2004 than in 2009 and there was a significant difference between the two assessments. The level of forest disturbance followed the 2004 trend, privately owned forests having the least disturbance, followed by the Central Government Forest Reserves. The most disturbed forests were the Local Government reserves. Reduction in tree/pole cutting in the EAMs indicates some successes in the conservation initiatives. The reduced level of disturbance could also have contributed to the reduced number of naturally dying trees recorded in this study.</p>	<p>Disturbance, threats and management effectiveness data were collected in early 2005 for 26 forests.</p> <p>Reassessments were done in 17 of the 26 forests (or 65%) in 2007/2008.</p> <p>In addition to the baseline data collected by the project, comparable data were also collected by Frontier Tanzania in other Eastern Arc Mountain forests. Data were collected from the Uluguru North and South Forest Reserves (2005), from all the Forest Reserves of the East Usambara Mountains (1999-2002), in the West Kilombero Scarp and New Dabaga forest of the Udzungwas (1999-2000), and in Mahenge Scarp and Nambiga Forest Reserves in Mahenge (2002-2003). Forest disturbance data were also collected by WCST in the Uluguru reserves in 2001.</p> <p>In addition to collecting data on human activities that affect the trees and poles, notes were also made on other signs of human activity such as the number of charcoal pits, snares, paths, fields and even houses.</p>
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<p>Indicator #3</p> <p>By 2008 none of the key E. Arc endemic species within the 20 key forest reserves are more threatened by extinction when compared with the 2003 Red List baseline.</p>	<p>The target set by the project was “no further species become threatened”. Data are not available to determine whether this has been achieved.</p> <p>Analysis would show that both Uluguru bush shrike and Loveridges sunbird were moved to higher level of threat during the projects life. BUT this was not really a fair measure as the reassignment of threat was due to more accurate data on remaining forest being provided by project to Red List authority. Hence, threat remained the same, but projects detailed work caused species to be reassessed as more threatened. At the same time a number of shrews were changed from CR to DD or not threatened. Again this was because of better data on forest area remaining and its condition, and not because of changes to threat.</p>	<p>This may have been a fair indicator if enough accurate data had been available at the beginning of the project, and at present, to know how threatened the key endemic species were and are, but this information (although more is being collected) is not yet close to being complete and thus this was not a good indicator.</p> <p>The indicator and the target are not consistent. The indicator is that none of the key endemics would become <i>more threatened</i> than they were in 2003. The target is that no <i>additional</i> species would become threatened.</p>
<p>Indicator #4</p> <p>By 2008 the volume of water flowing from E. Arc mountains into the Wami and Ruvu rivers shows no decline against the long term (1950s-1990s) baseline.</p>	<p>The target set by the project was “no further decline in flow”. The data are not available to determine whether the target has been achieved or not.</p> <p>No end line data is available to make the determination of whether or not the target level was achieved. The 2009 APR indicated that the project had no plans to reassess the indicator as data were being collected and maintained by the Water Ministry. As it turns out, this data was not being collected by the Ministry, thus it is not possible to determine whether this target was met.</p> <p>There is some data for northern rivers and the project did put in place some water monitoring in the Ulugurus under the Uluguru component. A consultant to analyze and interpret data has been engaged and the report is expected soon.</p>	<p>The project depended on others to collect this information, a reasonable and cost-effective approach if the information were really being collected. Unfortunately this was not the case. The project could have discovered this earlier on and made different arrangements for collecting this data. Budget constraints, however, also affected the ability of the project to collect this data.</p> <p>This was an important indicator to track as it would be of interest to the general population, water being such a critical issue in Tanzania and the project having been justified to some extent because of the importance of the EAMs for supplying water to Dar, Morogoro and many other areas. It is also important to have this information because of water services payment initiatives currently underway in the Ulugurus and anticipated new initiatives in other areas of the EAMs.</p>

<p>Indicator #5</p> <p>By 2006, prioritised forest reserves of the Eastern Arc mountains (covering at least 10,000 ha) are under a higher level of protected area status.</p>	<p>The target set by the project was “At least 10,000 ha under higher levels of protection”. The target has been achieved and surpassed.</p> <p>Five forest reserves in the EAMs (covering a total area of 178,503 ha) were upgraded to the status of Nature Reserves. These are Uluguru NR, Kilombero NR, Nilo NR, and Rungwe NR.</p> <p>An additional 4 forest reserves (Chome, Magamba, Mkingu, Uzungwa Scarp), covering a total area of 63,552 ha are in various stages (mostly advanced stages) of being gazetted as Nature Reserves.</p> <p>The nomination dossier to nominate the EAMs as a World Heritage Site was submitted to UNESCO in January, 2010. If successful, this would enhance the legal protection status of an additional 500,000 ha.</p> <p>65 forest reserves were classified according to the IUCN protected area classification system and these were subsequently accepted by UNEP-WCMC and added into the World PA database.</p>	<p>Although target levels have been achieved and even surpassed, it is important that the new Nature Reserves Center of FBD continue to support and actively work toward the gazettment of the remaining 4 proposed forest reserves until this is successfully concluded. The previous PC worked tirelessly toward this goal. It is now the duty of the new Nature Reserve Center staff to follow up. They are doing this now through the German-funded project.</p>
<p>Indicator #6</p> <p>By 2008 management effectiveness of 20 key forest reserves (covering at least 10,000 ha) measurably improved against 2004 baseline.</p>	<p>The target set by the project was “Management Effectiveness improved”. This target has been achieved.</p> <p>METT reassessments were done for 17 reserves, including 16 Catchment Forest Reserves, and 1 Nature Reserve. Thus 65 % of the 26 reserves that underwent an initial (baseline) METT were reassessed toward the end of the project.</p> <p>The Management effectiveness score for all reserves increased except for those for 4 Catchment Forest Reserves (Vumari, Mkusu, Kilindi and Nambinga).</p> <p>The mean management effectiveness score for all the reassessed reserves increased to 47% from the baseline average of 34.4%.</p>	<p>Both the baseline and the reassessment METTS were done by SUA together with DFOs (with 2 locals serving as guides).</p> <p>In the case of the Uluguru METT, only one person, i.e., the Conservator, was involved in doing the mid-term METT (December, 2008). It is best practice to involve several people.</p>

Based on the above, progress toward the objective was satisfactory in all cases where this could be assessed.

The Uluguru Component Objective—Results Achieved

The Uluguru component stated objective was “*Improved forest management and conservation and improved land husbandry practices in the Uluguru mountain forests and adjacent villages implemented by local communities, government authorities and other stakeholders*”. To measure progress towards the objective, the project identified 6 indicators. The table which follows lists these indicators along with the progress achieved to date and the comments of the TET. Because the latest progress report did not reflect actual progress as of the time of the evaluation, the TET made an effort to gather and update this information (presented below).

**Table 6.** Results Achieved Regarding the Uluguru Component Objective

<p>Indicator 1. Quantities of forest products harvested by local people under Joint Forest Management (JFM) agreements</p>	<p>The target set by the project was “At least 40% of forest products coming from JFM forest at end of project”. This target was <b>not</b> achieved.</p> <p>Management plans and draft bylaws were developed and are in place. Harvesting has not started because JFM agreements have not been signed awaiting approval of benefit sharing guidelines.</p>	<p>The TET does not consider this to be a very good indicator and furthermore, the target does not correspond well to it. The target refers to the percentage of forest products coming from JFM whereas the indicator refers to quantities harvested. In addition to working to promote JFM, the project also worked to increase the number of trees in villages so as to make these products available outside of forest reserves, thus, the target to increase the percentage of forest products coming from JFM does not recognize that, if tree plantings on farm and on schools are successful, this may actually decrease the need to get forest products from the reserves.</p>
<p>Indicator 2. Number of households adopting project supported agricultural and agro forestry interventions (overall and by intervention)</p>	<p>The target set by the project was 600 Households. The target <b>was</b> achieved and surpassed. The total number of households adopting the interventions was 1,399.</p>	<p>Interestingly, a relatively low percentage (20%) of households adopted woodlots even though the project analysis was that most people enter the forest (legally or otherwise) for firewood and poles.</p>

<p>Indicator 3. Number of households adopting project-supported income generation activities (overall and by intervention)</p>	<p>The target set by the project was 420. Although the target was for all practical purposes achieved in terms of number of households it was <b>not</b> achieved in the sense that very few IGAs had to do with the forest.</p> <p>There are 415 households participating in 17 different Income Generating Activities (IGAs), most of which are conventional or other strict agricultural activities (banana and pineapple cultivation, fish farming, livestock improvement).</p>	<p>The original indicator specified that the IGAs would be both forest and non-forest based. All of the IGAs are non-forest based except for one (beekeeping) which is only partly forest-based (as some of this is happening on farm).</p>
<p>Indicator 4. Number of tree seedlings planted and established.</p>	<p>The target of 8,000 seedlings <b>was</b> achieved and far surpassed.</p> <p>24,852 seedlings were planted and established. Out of these, 15,000 seedlings (60.4%) planted in farmers plots under agro forestry, 602 (2.4%) planted around schools through greening activities promoted under IEC component and 9,250 (37.2%) planted as enrichment planting in JFM forest and in farmers plots in four villages involved in JFM.</p>	<p>The survival rate of these trees is estimated by the project to be fairly high, although the TET observed severe infestations of many of those observed.</p>

<p>Indicator 5. CFR staff are maintaining accurate records from Biodiversity (BD) and hydrological monitoring</p>	<p>The target set by the project was “To conduct Biodiversity baseline survey” and “7 monitoring points targeted in seven rivers”. This target was <b>not</b> achieved.</p> <p>A biodiversity baseline survey was done. 4 rivers were monitored for water quality and flow volume. Some monitoring stations were only recently installed and another will be installed after project end. A hydrological report is being prepared but is not yet ready, therefore there is no answer yet on the possible change in water quality or quantity over the project life.</p>	<p>The target does not correspond well to the indicator. The indicator indicates an ongoing process, not a one-time event. A Biodiversity baseline Survey was done in 2005 but no reassessment of the biodiversity baseline was ever done. There is no evidence that CFR staff are monitoring biodiversity nor maintaining “accurate records on biodiversity”.</p> <p>It is also not good practice to combine two different things such as biodiversity and hydrological monitoring in a single indicator.</p> <p>Since the inception of the project, hydrological monitoring has been a responsibility of Catchment Forest Project (CFP) under FBD with CARE responsible for coordination of this under the project. After declaration of Uluguru Nature Reserve this responsibility has been shifted to UNR which will continue to conduct this monitoring as one of its routine activities.</p>
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Based on the above, overall progress toward the objective was moderately satisfactory.

#### 4.1.2 Results Achieved regarding Expected Outcomes

**Table 7.** Results achieved regarding expected outcomes pertaining to the strategy component

<p><b>Outcome 1:</b> Conservation status of Eastern Arc Mountains improved as stakeholders use the Eastern Arc strategy as a framework to guide conservation investments</p>	<p><b>Rating<sup>6</sup>: S</b></p>	
<p>Indicator #7</p> <p>By 2007, 9 proposed Eastern Arc forest reserves are gazetted increasing protected area coverage by 5,000 ha against 2004 baseline.</p>	<p>Rating: N</p> <p>Target: At least 5,000 ha gazetted</p> <p>Actual achievement: 4,124 ha of new FRs were gazetted.</p> <p>The Kitonga proposed FR, a large reserve at 10,000 ha (Iringa) has not yet been gazetted but the process is underway. This process involved relocating people who had encroached into the area. The relocation has been completed and the gazettment proposal is now with FBD.</p> <p>The Derema proposed FR (981 ha) in East Usambara is at an advanced stage in the process of gazettment. The proposal is now with the Permanent Secretary of the MNRT.</p> <p>The proposal to annex the Magombera FR (<b>600 ha</b>) to the Selous Game Reserve (an effort coordinated by WWF) has apparently failed.</p> <p>The Segoma/Kwamgumi/Bamba/Kwamtili FR (c.3000 ha) boundaries have been surveyed but nothing much has been done after the boundary survey. It seems survey data were misplaced.</p> <p>The proposed Kitemele FR in Kilolo District (----ha) is at an advanced stage in the gazettment process and is currently with the MNRT lawyer for review.</p>	<p>The specified target level is not consistent with the indicator as it is described. Whereas the indicator specifies “9 forest reserves are gazetted, increasing protected area coverage by 5,000 ha”, the target merely states that “at least 5,000 ha gazetted”.</p>

<sup>6</sup> RFA= Requires further analysis. Data was collected but not analyzed and synthesized in such a way as to be able to readily make a determination of whether target levels were achieved; NDA = No data available to make this determination.

<p>Indicator #8</p> <p>By 2008 at least 10 conservation projects operating in the Eastern Arc are mainstreamed under the NFP and are working together to tackle the priority issues identified in the E. Arc strategy.</p>	<p>Rating: A</p> <p>Target: At least 10 projects are mainstreamed under NF</p> <p>Actual Achievement: There are fewer projects mainstreamed under the NFP now compared with the number as of 30 June 2009 because there are fewer donor-supported projects now than then. The exact number of projects is unknown.</p>	<p>Forestry-related projects are now normally mainstreamed under the NFP and in this regard, even though the exact number of projects is unknown, the target can be considered as successfully achieved.</p>
<p>Indicator #9</p> <p>By 2007, the Eastern Arc Trust Fund utilises the E. Arc strategy as a guiding document for its investments.</p>	<p>Rating: A</p> <p>Target: Eastern Arc Mountains Endowment Fund uses E Arc strategy as key document</p> <p>Actual Achievement: The Endowment Fund has indicated its interest in supporting both the World Heritage Site (should it receive this designation), as well as the Nature Reserves and has also indicated its intention to support projects that address threats identified in the strategy document. The target has therefore been successfully achieved.</p>	
<p>Indicator #10</p> <p>By 2006 high biodiversity value Eastern Arc forest reserves are recognised as protected areas according to the IUCN/UNEP/WC MC PA system, against 2004 baseline of none being recognized.</p>	<p>Rating: A</p> <p>Target: All relevant Forest Reserves are assessed against IUCN PA categories</p> <p>Actual Achievement: Assessment of all major forest reserves in the EAMs was done to assign appropriate IUCN PA classifications. 65 Forest Reserves that were proposed as PAs were accepted and included in the UNEP-WCMC database.</p>	
<p>Indicator #11</p> <p>By 2008 E. Arc conservation strategy elements are incorporated into District Development Plans in each of 14 Districts covering the Arc.</p>	<p>Rating: NDA</p> <p>Target: Strategy elements incorporated in each of 14 Districts.</p> <p>Actual Achievement: No follow up was made by the project with the 14 Districts to determine if/what elements of the strategy were incorporated into their District Development Plans. The time between meetings to roll-out strategy document to districts, death of former PC and appointment of new office bearers was too short to have made the said follow up. Feedback meetings with</p>	<p>Much effort was invested by the PC and others in going to all 14 districts in the EAMs to meet with them about the strategy and encourage them to incorporate elements of the strategy in their own District Development Plans. Unfortunately, there was little follow up to find out if this was indeed done. The death of the PC had a serious impact in</p>

	<p>intention to roll-out the strategy document were conducted between August and December 2009. End of March is when the office was fully operating and this is the time when the office was expecting TET. Given time this target may well still be achieved but not in the stipulated time frame. The important thing was to sell the idea and evaluate the response. As per feedback meetings, the idea was accepted and there is probability of incorporating aspects of the strategy into district plans.</p>	<p>this regard.</p> <p>The impression of the TET is that although some progress has been made in this regard, the target was in all likelihood not achieved.</p>
<p><b>Outcome 2:</b> Eastern Arc forest values reflected in National and District priorities and budgets</p>	<p>Rating: MS</p>	
<p>Indicator #12</p> <p>By 2008 calculations of economic values of E. Arc forest result in at least 20% increased funding allocations through MTEF against 2004 baseline.</p>	<p>Rating: RFA (for a part of the indicator); A (for that part of the indicator that can be evaluated)</p> <p>Target: 20% increase over 50,000 USD</p> <p>Actual Achievement: Data is readily available for only Nature Reserves (and no other type of PA). The information needed to make the determination of whether or not the target was met for Nature Reserves was extracted by the TET from the WHS application. This indicates that “The funding available for the management of the core sites within the Eastern Arc Mountains has increased over time, and is currently around four times the allocation in 2004. This is proposed to increase still further. Even allowing for depreciation of the Tanzanian shilling this is still a major increase in funding commitment for the management of these sites.”</p> <p>In addition, meetings held by the TET with Districts (although few in number) indicate that there were some funding allocation increases in certain districts.</p> <p>Additional information provided by FBD indicates that EAM forests are reflected in the MTEF-medium-term expenditure framework and activities are budgeted for. All NRs have their budget line in the MFEF as well as other normal catchment Forest Reserves within EAM.</p>	<p>Any increase in funding allocations is not necessarily attributable to calculations of economic values of E. Arc forests.</p> <p>A graduate student of Neil Burgess is currently following up on this with the Districts for his dissertation but this is outside the project. Nevertheless, the information will be of great use even if it is too late to include in the terminal evaluation.</p>
<p>Indicator #13</p> <p>By 2008, water users are contributing funds to the conservation of E</p>	<p>Rating: A</p> <p>Target: Water users are contributing</p> <p>Actual Achievement: Water users including Coca-Cola and the Tanzanian Water Company are contributing approximately \$400,000 for the management of the</p>	<p>Although this project played a part in terms of ensuring synergy, linkages, and discussion and sharing of data, it was the WWF and CARE project that is responsible for this result. The</p>

A M, against baseline of \$0 contribution in 2004.	Uluguru Nature Reserve for payment for water services through WADA (the Water and Development Alliance), an initiative of USAID and Coca-Cola, and through a project of WWF and CARE.	result cannot be attributed to this project although it did play a part.
<p>Indicator #14</p> <p>By 2008 at least \$1 million additional funding within E. Arc Trust Fund against 2004 baseline.</p>	<p>Rating: N</p> <p>Target: At least 1 million USD additional in the fund</p> <p>Actual Achievement: Although the target was not achieved, significant effort was made by the project in this regard including an application to the Global Conservation Fund (which was not successful, reason unknown by project), a proposal to the German government (not successful because the German Government's policy does not allow contributions to trust funds), and a proposal very recently submitted to the Norwegian embassy for \$5 million (currently being considered by the Norwegian government).</p>	<p>Although significant effort was made by the project in this regard, even greater success might have been achieved if the project had contracted an expert in fund raising to dedicate time to work on this issue.</p>
<p>Indicator #15</p> <p>By 2008 National Resources Sector is accepted as a priority within Tanzania.</p>	<p>Rating: A</p> <p>Target: Natural resources is a priority sector</p> <p>Actual Achievement: At the beginning of the project, Tanzania used the terminology of "priority sectors". Education and health were amongst the priority sectors, whereas "natural resources" was not. This terminology is no longer in use. The intent of the indicator was to elevate the priority assigned by the government to natural resource management. The current President has assigned much greater importance to the management of natural resources compared to the situation at the outset of the project and in this regard there is success.</p>	<p>Although not specified as an indicator, the increase in number of government staff dedicated to natural resource management (a significant increase in number of staff for Nature Reserves compared to the baseline situation) is impressive and should also be considered.</p>
<p><b>Outcome 3:</b> E. Arc Adaptive Monitoring Program contributes to the national monitoring systems</p> <p><b>Rating:</b></p>	<p><b>Rating: MS</b></p>	
<p>Indicator #16</p> <p>By end 2005 E. Arc impact monitoring system contributing data to NGO</p>	<p>Rating: A</p> <p>Target: All relevant data shared</p> <p>Actual Achievement: Baseline data collected by the project was incorporated into the databases of several conservation NGOs including those of Conservation</p>	

databases.	International (CI), and Birdlife International. A data sharing agreement was made with CEPF/CI in 2006. Up-to-date endline data where available is also being shared and used already.	
Indicator #17  By end 2006 E. Arc impact monitoring system harmonised with and contributing data to NFP and PO-RALG databases.	<p>Rating: A</p> <p>Target: All relevant data shared</p> <p>Actual Achievement: The project helped to create a database (NAFOBEDA) that is maintained in the FBD. This database still exists but the current emphasis on forest carbon has resulted in the creation of a new national forest inventory database and it is not clear how much the project-supported database will now be used.</p>	
<b>Outcome 4:</b> Improved support for the conservation of the E. Arc at national and international levels  <b>Rating:</b>	<b>Rating: S</b>	
Indicator #18  By 2006 measurable change demonstrated in attitudes relating to conservation of E. Arc forests across 14 Districts, against 2004 baseline.	<p>Rating: A</p> <p>Target: Measurable change in attitudes</p> <p>Actual Achievement: TFCG developed an information, education and communication strategy for the Eastern Arc Mountains and successfully piloted the strategy including raising awareness through radio programmes, television, meetings, training events, billboards, newsletters, drama events, leaflets and posters. An analysis of the impact of the awareness component in the Rubeho Mountains indicated that awareness and attitudes towards the E. Arc were significantly higher in the participating villages than in a control village. The TET did note a good level of awareness about the importance of conserving the EAM forests for water, biodiversity, carbon and sustainable resource extraction. It is not possible to know if this level of awareness is statistically different from the baseline situation.</p>	<p>Although TOR to undertake a study to measure changes in attitudes were drafted by the Technical Advisor, TFCG was not able to undertake this study due to slow procurement within FBD. Thus, the information is not available to understand whether there have been significant changes in attitudes toward the conservation of the EAM forests or not.</p> <p>There appears to be positive change in attitude at the level of Village leaders, Committee members, extension staff and most villagers. A Master's Thesis looking at the impact of the information, education and awareness piloting activities provides an assessment of the impact on awareness and attitudes at the community level.</p>

		The way in which the baseline is described is weak. Whether or not people know the term “Eastern Arc” is not the salient point. Many may be well aware of the importance of the forests but may be unfamiliar with the relatively new name of Eastern Arc.
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**Table 8.** Results achieved regarding expected outcomes pertaining to the Uluguru component

<b>Outcome 1 Rating: MS</b>	Indicator	Target	Actual Achievement
Outcome 1: Management and protection systems in the Catchment Forest Reserves (CFRs) are substantially improved, and biodiversity and hydrological values better understood.	Indicator 6. Biodiversity baseline report for Uluguru Mountains CFRs completed by end of 2005	Target was to have it by end of 2005	
	Indicator 7. Preliminary Hydrology Monitoring report for Uluguru Mountains CFRs completed by end of Project	7 monitoring points targeted in seven rivers, data are collected and preliminarily analysed. Final analysis will be done before the end term evaluation.	4 rivers are monitored for water quality and flow volume. Through the PWS program, CARE will install 3 new hydrological monitoring stations around Kibungo starting end of 2009

	Indicator 8. Uluguru South Catchment Forest Reserve boundaries surveyed and clearly maintained by the end of 2008	Re-survey and reopening and planting of <i>Khaya sp</i> of FRB totaling 136km.	137 km (100%) have been re-surveyed, re-opened and planted with <i>Khaya sp</i> and maintained. <b>20 encroachers moved from FR</b> In addition 4.4 km of boundary planted with <i>Khaya sp</i> in the Bunduki corridor
<b>Outcome 2 Rating: MS</b>			
Outcome 2: Joint forest management and other resource use arrangements established	Indicator 9. Three CFR Patrol teams formed and patrols started by 2007	3 CFR patrol teams	4 patrol teams have been established-one in each JFM village.  The patrol teams are quite active. In 2008 helped CFP to get hold of 3 illegal timber harvesters in Uluguru South where 83 pieces of <i>Ocotea usambareniss</i> timber were confiscated and the culprits taken to court. No illegal activities reported or spotted in 2009
	Indicator 10. At least 4 villages adjacent to NYANDINDUMA forest reserve have signed and approved JFM agreement by end of project	4 JFM agreements signed and approved	Training of trainers on PFM Good Governance (GG) conducted for CFP and DLNRO staff.  Village Environmental Committee (VNRC) and patrol teams established in each of the 4 villages involved in JFM. Zonal committee with 4 representatives from each of the 4 JFM villages established.  Members of both committees and patrol teams have been trained in Good Governance.  JFM agreements not signed yet awaiting for approval on revenue sharing modality.
	Indicator 11. At least 1 village forest management plan prepared by end of Project	At least 1 village forest management plan prepared.	Village forest management plan prepared in all 4 villages involved in JFM
<b>Outcome 3 Rating: S</b>			
Outcome 3: Capacity of local communities	Indicator 12. 2,000 multipurpose tree seedlings	10,000 multipurpose trees planted by the end of	15,000 multipurpose trees have been planted up to June 2008 and they are being managed. Average survival rate is 75% as of the latest assessment in May, 2009.

in sustainable land use management enhanced	planted in the project area annually starting from 2005	project	
	Indicator 13. 50 farmers involved in farmer to farmer exchange visits annually by type of intervention	2500 farmers involved in exchange visits by end of project	742 farmers involved in exchange visits up to June 2008. For sustainability reasons, emphasis is now placed on learning from demonstration plots in each village with the help of para-professionals
	Indicator 14. 600 farmers trained per intervention for Agro forestry, land husbandry and crop husbandry intervention by the year 2009	600 farmers trained per intervention by end of the project	The training guide for para-professionals has been completed.  Cumulatively 2732 farmers trained per intervention of which 52 farmers (7%) trained as para-professionals who will continue to train other farmers after project ends to ensure sustainability. The paraprofessionals have been equipped with guide book and field equipments. The remaining 680 farmers (93%) trained in Sustainable Land Management (SLM) best practices package promoted by the project as detailed in the Agriculture Strategy document of which 271 (40%) have been trained by para-professionals and 409 (60%) trained by project staff (UMADEP and DALDO).
	Indicator 15. 10 tree nurseries of Agro forestry trees established (1 in each village)	10 agro forestry nurseries.	16 tree nurseries were established in four villages around Nyandiduma Forest Reserve (in community nurseries and school nurseries). Most of these are no longer operational. Only 3 still exist in the villages of Kibungo, Nyingwa and Lanzi.
<b>Outcome 4 Rating: MS</b>			
Outcome 4: Selected opportunities for income generation in the Uluguru mountains developed (emphasizing sustainable use of forest resources)	Indicator 16. 3 IGAs both forest and non-forest based are identified in each village inside the project area by end of project	30 IGAs both forest and non forest based IGA.	In addition 21 groups of 25 members each in 7 villages were trained in <i>Allanblackia</i> spp. seed collection. The seeds contain unsaturated edible oils/fats. These groups have been to Novel Development Tanzania Limited (NDTL), a national company involved in international marketing of the seeds.  In addition there are 80 households engaged in beekeeping and there are 56 households involved in fish farming in four villages.
	Indicator 17. 6 group	60 group members	2,600 group members have been trained in IGAs. (1300 males and 1,300 females)

	members from each Project village area trained in an IGA by end of project	trained in IGA	
	Indicator 18. At least 10 VS & L groups per village established with institutional restrictions over forest destructive activities in each of 10 project villages	100 VS & L groups established	106 VS & L Groups established (73 in project area, 33 outside project area). The 33 groups established outside the project area <i>found out about the VS &amp; L and asked for help from Community Based Trainers from the project. Excellent realized replication and excellent sustainability prospects.</i>  100% of VS & L group constitutions clearly prohibit involvement of members in forest destructive activities. UMEMCP has continued to support mechanism to promote and strengthen conservation linkage to the rest of the groups supported by the project through a CBO that prohibits involvement of VS & L members in forest destructive activities
	Indicator 19. At least 3 market linkages for IGAs in project area are identified and maintained by end of project	3 linkage targeted	3 linkages to market access for pineapple and banana were identified and operational. In addition another market linkage on <i>Allanblackia</i> was established with a private company, Novel Development Tanzania Ltd but they have not yet begun to sell their product because the group was established during the off-season. CARE does not have estimates of how much revenue they are earning from these IGAs. There are 654 households involved in bananas and pineapples, 113 in fish farming and vegetables, and 162 involved in beekeeping and vegetables. A beekeeping IGA recently started. Although the project did not identify the market for the honey that will be produced, it ensured a strong linkage with the District Beekeeping department.
<b>Outcome 5</b>			
<b>Rating: S</b>			
Outcome 5: Conservation awareness increased at all levels (through education campaigns politicians, schools, opinion leaders and	Indicator 20. At least 2 Conservation Awareness clubs for information disseminating will be formed in each division by the end of 2007	5 clubs	15 conservation awareness clubs involving primary school pupils formed in Lanzi, Nemele (Tandali village), Mlono, Vinile, Bunduki, Nyandira, Kikeo, Chohero, Mgata, Nemele, Tegetero, Tchenzema, Nyingwa Konde and Pinde villages. One conservation awareness club involving community members established in Mlono village.

local communities).	Indicator 21. At least 50 local leaders will attend awareness events each year	250 local leaders	Cumulatively 199 local leaders have attended awareness events
	Indicator 22. At least 3 TV& 10 radio features will be broadcasted each year	15 TV and 50 radio features broadcasted	68 radio broadcastings and. 3 Features of TV broadcasted
	Indicator 23. One theatre group established	1 theatre group established	1 theatre group has been established to sensitize and create awareness to .community members and other stakeholders through cultural performances. The group sometimes gets paid engagements to perform.
	Indicator 24. At least 5 Schools will have active environmental clubs at the end of project	5 clubs	15 conservation awareness clubs involving primary school pupils formed in Lanzi, Nemele (Tandali village), Mlono, Vinile, Bunduki, Nyandira, Kikeo, Chohero, Mgata, Nemele, Tegetero, Tchenzema, Nyingwa Konde and Pinde villages.  1 conservation awareness club involving community members established in Mlono village
	Indicator 25. Strategy documentation produced by end of project	Strategy document	Final document is ready and is being implemented
<b>Outcome 6 Rating: MS</b>			
Social economic program around the people interface and broader livelihood issues developed and under implementation.	Indicator 26. Socio-economic monitoring system developed and field tested by end of 2006	Socio-economic monitoring system developed and field tested by end of 2006	Socio-economic monitoring tools developed and field tested in 9 villages within the Eastern Arc Mountains
	Indicator 27. Socio-economic monitoring strategy produced by end of the project	Strategy completed by end of the project	Data on impacts of PFM on livelihoods collected in 9 villages within the Eastern Arc Mountains area. The lessons gathered and fed into Eastern Arc and Reduced Emission from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) strategies and the new National Forest Policy that is being prepared. In addition, findings have been shared with PFM

			practitioners and other stakeholders from district to national level in two forms: as a technical paper and as a policy brief. At international level same results have been published in the recent issue of the International Forestry Review Vol 11 (2), 2009-pages 239-253
	Indicator 28. Socio-economic monitoring methodology in place and under implementation by end of project	Methodology completed and adapted by end of the project	Draft strategy is being finalized for sharing with stakeholders before project ends. The methodology was completed in 2006 but has not been used because the final simplified version has not yet been produced.

### TET Observations Regarding JFM in Nature Reserves

Benefits that local communities can derive from Nature Reserves are more limited compared with those from production forests. The TET was informed that in the case of Nature Reserves, the only benefits can be from tourism, research, education and hanging beehives in certain areas of Reserves. Just as in the case of JFM in production forests, until benefit-sharing guidelines are approved by central government, even these limited benefits are only theoretical. So far, it seems likely that benefits to communities will be reduced. In the case of the only NR visited by the TET, when this was still a Forest Reserve (before being designated the Kilombero Nature Reserve), 100% of the revenues generated from tourism went to two villages bordering the reserve (this revenue allowed them to finish building their school). Now that it is a Nature Reserve, at least some percent (whether it is 50% or more) will go to government and the remaining 50 or so percent will have to be shared between some 15 villages, thus reducing significantly the revenue going to each local community. Before any of this becomes a reality on the ground, VNRCs need to be formed, management agreements need to be prepared, and benefit-sharing guidelines approved. Another serious constraint that will likely affect the success of JFM in Nature Reserves is the role of VNRCs in managing these areas. The project supported the establishment of the VNRC which subsequently established a patrol team which has apparently been regularly patrolling some areas of the Reserve (to date without receiving anything in return except for a recent donation of boots, raincoats and two bicycles from the German funds). The TET observed that it was quite a distance from the nearest village to the boundary of the NR, and that the distance alone, compounded by lack of transport, meant that in all likelihood villagers could at best patrol only a small area of the boundary. Furthermore, they had not even the basic equipment to do so, only their machetes. Untrained villagers without machetes cannot deter elephant poachers who are armed with semi-automatic weapons, and attempting to do so can well put villagers in danger. Kilombero is one of the few Nature Reserves in the country that still has large mammals including elephants. At least in the case of this Reserve, a more realistic patrolling and anti-poaching plan needs to be developed. Villagers do not have the capacity (technical or material) to effectively assume this responsibility. The fact that 8 elephants were killed last year in the Reserve (by a local villager) is testament to this. (Because the Udzungwa National Park borders this NR, there are TANAPA rangers stationed in the NR who are responsible for poaching patrols and who are much better equipped to do so even though their own situation could and should also be improved to allow them to be more effective in controlling poaching.) In addition to supporting the establishment of the VNRCs, the project also supported the preparation of management agreements that outline the responsibilities of the VNRCs and the types of benefits to be derived from the

Reserve. The personal observations of the TET were that (at least in the case of the one NR the TET visited) these were not well developed even though they supposedly had been developed with broad community participation. The agreement outlined all sorts of activities that are not even permitted in NRs. The Kilombero NR is remote and does not currently receive many tourists. In terms of sustainability, it will be important that both local people and the government benefit from the existence of the NR. Tourism and research seem to be the two most likely activities that could generate some revenue, but in both cases, significant investment in creating the market for these needs to be made. It would be good if the new UNDP/GEF project for southern parks could help in this regard. A caution here about new roads. A new road being built with German funds leads into the NR from the new NR office. This new road may have unintended detrimental effects. According to the Conservator of Kilombero NR, it used to take a full day to travel another (old) road into the NR, now (with the improved road) it takes only 3 hours. As a result of that road, many new farms were established along that road. Agricultural encroachment is a key threat to many forest reserves and great care should be taken when considering new road construction. In the case of Kilombero, consideration should be given to building an airstrip close to the closest village for small airplanes to bring tourists to the reserve that way. Of course a full impact assessment should be done to see if this does indeed make sense or not but it is difficult to imagine any significant number of tourists making the long drive from Dar or even from Ruaha, the closest NP (other than the less-visited Udzungwa) to get to Kilombero.

The TET acknowledges that, as pointed out in a comment on the draft report, the issue of benefit – sharing is a tricky one, benefit often being interpreted and advocated mostly in monetary terms. The TET understands that this type of benefit is difficult to realize in many forests because no harvesting of timber is allowed in Catchment or Nature Reserves forests, but that, once a JFM agreement is in place, forest products earmarked for utilization become benefits to local communities. Another benefit is revenue generated from nature tourism. All management plans for Nature Reserves in Tanzania include nature tourism. Income generated from these initiatives will be shared with local communities, although how much and how is still to be worked out. The 18 villages surrounding the well-visited Amani Nature Reserve on the so-called “northern circuit” that includes Serengeti, Ngorongoro and other very popular protected areas with the necessary infrastructure and marketing to be able to attract and manage large numbers of tourists, each get 20% of the ecotourism income that is generated and further benefit in that tour guides from the villages are employed by the Reserve and also have their own small tourism businesses. As pointed out elsewhere in this report, it is unlikely that the Forest Reserves, including the Nature Reserves, will be able to attract or accommodate an equivalent number of tourists anytime in the immediate future because these forests are more remote, less well known, and much more difficult and time-consuming to access for the typical tourist. The GOT, with assistance from UNDP/GEF, is planning to promote the so-called southern circuit to attract more tourists to this area and to relieve some of the pressure on the northern parks. As long as this is well planned and managed, there could be significant benefits to both the parks and the people as a result of that effort.

The GOT is also making an effort to institute payment for environmental services, and to derive benefits for local communities related to carbon sequestration and climate change mitigation.

## **4.2 Project Impacts**

### **4.2.1 Global Environmental Impacts**

Global environmental impacts are on biodiversity conservation, climate change, pharmaceutical/medicinal (modern and traditional) knowledge and products, and hydrological cycles. The global significance of the Eastern Arc Mountain forests of Tanzania (a mega-biodiversity country) is indisputable. The EAMs are recognized internationally as an area with an exceptional concentration of endemic species. This is one of the smallest and most threatened biodiversity hotspots in the world with one of the highest concentrations of threatened species in the world. Loss of this biodiversity means it is lost not only from Tanzania but from the world at large. More than 405 plant species found in Tanzania (many of them in the EAMs) have been studied for their ethno-pharmacological properties and contribute much to the medical scientist communities. Conserving this biodiversity has, therefore, clear global environmental impact.

### **4.2.2 National level Impacts**

The project had important national level impacts that can be observed now, at the end of almost seven years of effort, and it can be reasonably assumed that even more perceptible impacts will continue to be felt in the future.

One impact that is not quantifiable is the sense of ownership of the project. Project ownership is strong. Although the original project design envisaged use of many external consultants, this approach was changed to bring ownership of the project and project activities under FBD. As a result, FBD perceives the project outcomes as internally generated, and there is a sense of ownership which will continue even beyond the project lifetime, unlike many other projects where the project achievements end with the end of financing. In addition, the mode of operation has been replicated to other projects now in the pipeline such as the UN-REDD Tanzania Programme and Extending Coastal Forest Protected Area Network. In these ways and others the FBD believes the project has brought value for money. As FBD staff are deployed to work within EAM; working gears are being improved and staffing is being increased. More funds are being committed as compared to the 2004 baseline (pers. comm Kilahama and Burgess). Capacity of FBD staff to carryout various activities was also enhanced and is an important national impact. Capacities including forest cover change assessment were developed, drafting and compiling the world heritage site nomination dossier was a result of the project and also led to enhancement of national capacity.

Overall, protected area coverage in the EAMs increased by over 500,000 ha from what it was at the beginning of the project, and is likely to increase even more in the near future as a direct result of this project, mainly through upgrading of existing reserves but also through the gazettement of new reserves. Forest coverage in the EAMs continued to decrease, although the *rate* of deforestation also decreased in most (but not all) forest areas where comparative baseline and endline measurements were made. In detail, from 2000 to 2008, on average forest was lost at a rate of 40 ha per year compared to 138 ha per year for woodlands. However, when compared to the period from 1990 to 2000, the rates of forest loss have slightly increased while those for woodland have significantly decreased. Change detection analysis has revealed lower rates of forest loss which falls under reserved land, compared to woodlands, which falls under non-reserved land. Disturbance transect data from 17 forests suggest that there was no significant improvement in terms of reduced tree cutting in these areas in 2009

compared with the baseline in 2004, however there was a significant improvement in reduced pole extraction in most of these reserves. The most striking improvement in terms of reduced disturbance was in a private forest reserve (a reserve not included in the project intervention). Repeat surveys in 2004 and 2009 show that key threats have been reduced in all 26 forests where such assessments were conducted. The Threat Reduction Assessment (TRA) index for these forests ranged from 29.2% to 79.8 % (the higher the TRA, the greater the reduction in threats). The greatest reduction in threats was in the private reserve, which, as stated previously was not included in the project. Management effectiveness of forests improved from a mean score of 34.4% at baseline measurement to 47% near project end. Connectivity between forests improved somewhat. The Bunduki gap between North and South Uluguru was closed, and a corridor is now being re-established (although not as wide as would be preferred if relocation efforts had been more successful). Some important gaps between forests still exist (in the East Usambaras and between Kilombero and Uzungwas Scarp Nature Reserves in the Uzungwas) that present significant threats to these forests, but there is good progress being made and grounds for hope that these too will be closed soon. The capacity of a diverse array of stakeholders was enhanced, but may not yet be strong enough to ensure continuity without further support of some kind. Knowledge of the biodiversity found in the EAMs was increased, as was the knowledge of the conservation status of this biodiversity (although much remains to be learned). The full impact of the conservation strategy document developed by the project is still not known, although the Endowment Fund has indicated intent to use it in guiding their decisions on financial support, and there are hopeful (but still very preliminary) signs that Districts will incorporate elements of the strategy into their own District Development Plans. The impact of the effort to have the EAMs declared a World Heritage Site is still not known as no decision has been taken by UNESCO on the nomination submitted only a few months ago (in January, 2010). Nevertheless, should the nomination be successful, this would help secure the area in terms of a globally important set of protected areas managed for their biodiversity values. Although not attributable entirely to the project, the project clearly had a positive influence on the government's decision to increase funding and staffing of forest and nature reserves, the impact of which is certain to be felt over the coming years.

The project also played an important role in assisting Tanzania in leveraging UN REDD funding and German Government Climate Change Initiative funding (collectively around \$8.8 million), and in helping Tanzania prepare a R-PIN for the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. The project's investment in a comparative carbon study assessing carbon stocks within and outside protected areas, and associated capacity building and advocacy was instrumental in paving the way for Tanzania to become a Quick Start country under the UN REDD programme. Without this investment it is quite likely that Tanzania would not have been invited to join Quick Start. It is noted that UN REDD programme activities and associated REDD activities financed by the Government of Norway will significantly increase the funding available for forest conservation and is expected to improve sector governance—critical to stemming forest loss. This is critical to ensuring the long-term sustainability of conservation efforts spearheaded by the project.

The above-described impacts resulted from the conservation strategy component of the project. The Uluguru component also had some important impacts although the coverage in terms of number of villages (15) was small (and far fewer than the originally anticipated number of 32 villages), limiting overall impact. Moreover, because many activities did not begin in earnest on the ground until after the MTE (due to reasons described later in this report) there was not much time to fully develop these activities. The most important impacts of the Uluguru component of the project are that financial and organizational capacity of villagers was enhanced, agricultural productivity was increased, sustainable land management practices related to agriculture were

widely adopted, market links were strengthened (mostly for conventional agricultural produce such as bananas and pineapples but also for the less-conventional *Allanblackia* seeds), and awareness of the importance of the forest was enhanced as was the capacity to enforce forest protection laws and bylaws (through the formation of Village Natural Resource Committees or VNRCs, and patrol teams associated with these).

One *assumes* all this has contributed to decreasing pressure on the Uluguru forests, but this is difficult to know with certainty because the project has not directly assessed this. Rather the project has tried to determine if the wellbeing of villagers was enhanced as a result of the project interventions, reasoning that enhanced wellbeing would result in decreased forest pressure. The data available for the Uluguru Nature Reserve (UNR) suggest that total forest area increased slightly from the baseline measurement of 24,008.59 ha in 2005 to the most current estimate of 24,115.09 ha in 2008. Management effectiveness of the UNR has improved from the baseline measurement of 45.5 % in 2004 and 51 % in 2005, to the most recent METT of 63.9 % in 2009. Spot checking indicates that the number of footpaths (an indicator of disturbance) have decreased by 80% since 2004 (2009 data). In addition, pit sawing sites, traps and snares were not spotted in 2009. Overall, the conservation status of the UNR appears to have improved as a result of increased human and financial resources.

The project claims that “Results of participatory wealth ranking conducted in a self assessment study showed that the poor wellbeing households are the ones who use building poles and thatch grasses for house construction as opposed to the medium income and rich households who use bricks and iron sheets to construct their houses. Thus improving well-being of the people means reducing their dependence to forest for building poles.” The report continues “as a result of the combination of VS & L, SLM and IGAs promoted by the project, the proportion of rich households increased slightly from 4.1% before the project to 9.5% after the project, whereas the proportion of medium income households increased significantly from 18.2% before the project to 35.5% after the project. Conversely, the proportion of the poor households decreased from 77.7% before the project to 55.0% after the project. As already noted increased proportion of the rich and medium income households means a reduced demand for building poles and hence reduced pressure to the UNR.” The project also argues that “Adoption of SLM practices means that soil fertility is maintained and land productivity improved. This means the need to clear forest land in search of fertile land hence dependence on UNR is reduced. Similarly, considering the potential of agroforestry to produce forest products such as firewood and poles it is obvious that this also contributes to reduced dependence on the UNR.”

The TET believes that both lack of sufficient agricultural land (due to whatever reasons) and poverty are both important causes of forest degradation and destruction, but that enhancing agricultural productivity and wellbeing does not *necessarily* decrease this pressure. It would have been helpful to have a more direct monitoring of the impact of the CARE activities on the forests and the biodiversity therein, especially in the globally significant Uluguru Nature Reserve. Some information is available that is encouraging. A recent spot check patrol found that foot paths in the UNR, one indicator of forest disturbance, had decreased by 80% since 2005.

Although work was done to establish and strengthen VNRCs, the TET did not find this effort to be of significant impact given that benefit-sharing agreements are yet to be approved by government (thus preventing any benefit from being derived by villages until such a time as this is sorted out). The Nyandinduma production forest is highly degraded and it will be several years before any extraction is possible. Little if anything was being done to sort out how VNRCs might benefit from the UNR (once benefit-sharing was agreed). Likewise, it is not clear what the

impact of the IGAs is on the forests. Although conventional income-generating activities (IGAs) were supported by the project, and these did have the effect of enhancing agricultural productivity and enhancing overall well-being of people in the participating villages, only one IGA was linked with the forest (beekeeping) and this had only recently begun, thus no honey had yet been produced for sale. The impact of the IGAs on forest use by those participating in IGAs is not clear.

## 5 FINDINGS: SUSTAINABILITY & REPLICABILITY

This section assesses the likelihood of sustainability of project outcomes at project end. As per the TOR for this evaluation, the four dimensions of sustainability as described by UNDP/GEF are rated using the rating system specified below:

Likely (L): There are no risks affecting this dimension of sustainability.

Moderately Likely (ML). There are moderate risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.

Moderately Unlikely (MU): There are significant risks that affect this dimension of sustainability

Unlikely (U): There are severe risks that affect this dimension of sustainability

<b>Dimension of Sustainability</b>	<b>Rating assigned by TE</b>
Financial resources	MU
Sociopolitical	ML
Institutional framework and governance	ML
Environmental	ML

Regarding the “environmental” dimension of sustainability, the TOR for the evaluation specify that this dimension is to consider “any environmental risks that can undermine the future flow of project environmental benefits”. “The TE should assess whether certain activities in the project area will pose a threat to the sustainability of the project outcomes. For example, construction of dam in a protected area could inundate a sizable area and thereby neutralizing the biodiversity related gains made by the project.” Although there are no such threats that the TET is aware of in the project area, it is vast and it was not possible for the TET to obtain information on all development plans for all the EAMs.

The TOR for the evaluation specify that the overall rating for sustainability cannot be higher than the lowest rating for any of the above aspects of sustainability as described by the TOR. The overall rating for sustainability is therefore MU due to the rating assigned to “financial resources”, even though ratings for all other areas are higher. The TET’s first inclination was to assign a rating of ML for the financial resources dimension of sustainability but based on inputs received on the first draft of this report the rating has been lowered as suggested.

The two project components had distinct approaches to ensure sustainability of project outcomes:

The conservation strategy component tried to ensure elements of the conservation strategy were mainstreamed in FBD, EAMCEF and into the Districts. It worked to increase funding available to conservation efforts (including continuation of those undertaken by the project) in the EAMs through the EAMCEF.

The Uluguru Mountains component tried to ensure that communities understood and received the benefits from conserving rather than destroying forests, that alternatives to use of forest products existed through generation of income (mostly unrelated to the forest), and that the organizational and financial capacity of communities nearby to forests was enhanced to better enable them to capture such benefits.

The logic of these approaches was good. The results were moderately successful as described in greater detail in the following sections.

### **5.1 Institutional sustainability & country ownership**

Institutional sustainability is enhanced because country ownership is strong. Country ownership is strong for several reasons: a) the project is relevant to the national development and environmental agenda and is in line with national policies and strategies, b) the project incorporated in its design a mechanism to ensure financial sustainability (joint project with the WB which helped the government to establish the Endowment Fund), c) the project is nationally executed (NEX) which greatly enhances ownership, d) there is representation of central and District level government on the PMC (with each of the involved 14 Districts represented) which enhances government ownership, e) the project is physically housed in a government office.

One indication of country ownership is incorporation of project outcomes into District Development plans. The two regions visited by the TET (Morogoro and Iringa) and the three districts within these (Morogoro Rural, Mvomero and Kilolo) have incorporated certain outcomes from the project in their development plans. All these regions and districts have budget lines for natural resources including forest in their budgets. In the Morogoro region and its two districts the existence of these budget lines was a direct result of the project, while in Iringa region and in Kilolo districts these budget lines existed before the project but the funds allocated to this budget line were increased because of the existence of the project. The budget line for forest in Iringa Rural District (a part of which is the current Kilolo district) existed since the MEMA project in which ended in year 2006). The Kilolo District has allocated a modest but increasing amount of money for forestry issues (TShs 12 Mil., 13 Mil. and 24 Mil. for budget year 2008/2009, 2009/10 and 2010/11 respectively). The total amounts allocated are still nowhere close to enough to meet forest conservation needs, but this is nevertheless a positive trend.

Relevant country representatives are actively involved in project implementation. Regional commissioners, Regional Administrative Secretaries, District commissioners, District Executive Directors, District Administrative Secretaries, project related sector officers, Village Governments, Village Natural Resources Committee members and communities participated at different levels of project planning and implementation. District representation on the PMC also helps sustainability.

Although the project did have a solid strategy to enhance sustainability of expected project outcomes, and although there is a fair chance that many of the achieved outcomes will be sustained, there are clearly also some risks related to institutional sustainability resulting from inadequate achievement of institutional capacity (in FBD, Districts and communities), and

inadequate level of maturity achieved of some project-initiated activities (especially related to the Uluguru component), meaning that the project will leave these at a stage at which their continuation and further maturation is left to some extent to hope. The TET noted that, with the exception of FBD staff in Dar es Salaam and some of the Regional Catchment Forest Officers, the usual response when FBD staff were asked about relevant issues in the EAM forests was that the Technical Advisor would have such information. It was normally not known, and did not appear to be at hand. If it was, no one knew where to access it. In many cases, there was little awareness of even basic background information (which the TET was aware existed in numerous reports prepared by the project). This is an indication that greater effort should have been made regarding capacity building in FBD. The TET acknowledges the fact that the individual from the FBD most intimately involved in the strategy component of the project during the period following the MTE, the PC, was surely fully aware and informed and that his passing surely left a big hole.

## **5.2 Financial Sustainability**

The Tanzanian Government has made a significant financial commitment to the project by providing offices for the project, paying the salaries of the FBD staff involved in the project, creating a new Nature Reserves Centre in the FBD, and significantly increasing the number of staff working in Nature Reserves. In both Kilolo and Iringa Rural districts the number of staff involved in project activities increased from one in 2004 to twenty in 2010. These financial commitments are likely to be sustained after project end.

Nevertheless, significant additional financing will be required to ensure sustainability of project outcomes and to build upon these. According to a 2005 baseline report, the water, hydropower and non-timber forest products of the Eastern Arc Mountain forests generate over US\$ 175 million every year for the people of Tanzania. The Government invests less than 0.3% of that value in their management. This situation has not changed significantly from project start. There is still a great need for more funds to be devoted to the management of these resources.

The original plan was that the Endowment Fund would have sufficient resources to finance much of the needed conservation efforts in the EAMs. The EAMCEF was severely hit by the 2008 global economic crisis. Moreover, the funding it received from the World Bank ended in December 2009 at a time at which EAMCEF had not yet been able to attract funding from other sources. According to the Secretariat of the EAMCEF, this scenario puts EAMCEF at a very bad financial position and uncertain future sustainability. A proposal to the Norwegian government for US\$ 5,375,250 to support the operations and activities of the Endowment Fund is currently being finalized and includes funding activities to improve the management of the Nature Reserves in the EAMs. If approved, the *Strengthening the Eastern Arc Mountains Conservation Endowment Fund as a Sustainable Funding Mechanism for the Eastern Arc forests of Tanzania project* would allow the endowment of the Trust to remain invested for a further 5 years, during which it is estimated that it would grow to over \$12 million which would provide a significantly better annual income than presently. It must be emphasized that this is only a proposal and there is no indication at this time whether it will be successful.

In addition, a financial co-financing proposal will be submitted to the German Climate Change Initiative in December of this year. That proposal would seek to add further money to project support and oversight through the Trust Fund and also to further endow the capital base of the Trust Fund. If this strategy is successful these two proposals will allow the Endowment Fund to grow in importance and funding capacity and to potentially achieve its target of a \$15 million investment and interest payments for sustainable financing within the next 5 years. Just as in

the case of the proposal to the Norwegian government, there is no way of knowing at this time whether these funds will actually be secured.

In the event that the above proposals are successful, these two funding sources could make a significant difference in helping to ensure the sustainability of project outcomes but it must be stressed that no funding has yet been secured and there is no way of knowing at this time whether it will be or not.

Several NGOs, including WCST, TFCG, CARE, WWF, CI, as well as academic institutions, have projects in the EAMs which will continue after this project ends thus also contributing to sustainability. In addition, it is anticipated that the UNDP/GEF project “Strengthening the Protected Area Network in Southern Tanzania” may be able to provide some limited financial support to the Udzungwa NR, one of the largest in the EAMs.

Despite some good prospects, the financial sustainability is still in question and every effort should be made by the GOT, UNDP, GEF and other stakeholders and donors to secure additional financing to ensure sustainability of project outcomes.

### **5.3 Knowledge Management**

The project created a good website with almost all (but not all) of the reports and other documentation produced by the project and helpful links to relevant initiatives.

There was good sharing of data collected by the project through the strategy component, and this data has been incorporated into the databases of conservation NGOs and others thus ensuring that these project results are widely known and used.

There was quite a lot of attention given to the baseline, but not much to the end line. This is important knowledge and this was not as well managed as it might have been.

### **5.4 Replicability**

Replicability of some project activities was good. VS&L is already being replicated even outside the project area and without external assistance. As previously mentioned, the partnership model adopted by the project is also being replicated in another new project on Coastal Forests, although to a more limited extent.

It is doubtful that the JFM project “model” will be replicated any time soon, and there is no reason why projects should strive to do so until the government approves benefit-sharing arrangements.

## **6 CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS & LESSONS**

Conclusion: Overall, the conservation strategy component of the project was successful, and as a result of this effort there are perceptible positive impacts on the EAM forests.

Conclusion: Minimizing numbers of external consultancies and ensuring involvement of FBD staff resulted in the institutional strengthening. An even greater focus on ensuring FBD staff in the field (not just senior manager in Dar) had the overall picture regarding conservation status of the EAMs and more conservation-related information regarding the areas where they work at

their finger-tips would have been useful. When asked specific conservation-related questions, FBD field staff often replied that this question would have to be answered by the Technical Advisor. Although attention was given to capacity building, and the National Execution modality adopted by the project enhanced capacity building opportunities, an even greater focus on capacity building may have enhanced sustainability prospects even more.

Conclusion: The Uluguru component also had positive impacts, but these impacts were more on the wellbeing of local people and not so directly on the forests. The Uluguru component of the project adopted a strategy which involved 2 main elements:

One element of the strategy was to try to help local people meet their needs for the products they would have normally gotten from the forest by:

1. Growing these same (or similar species) outside the forest reserves, on their own land (farms, schools).
2. Increasing their monetary income so they could buy these or other substitute products instead of taking them from the forest. (17 IGAs, most of which were focused on increased agricultural productivity of bananas, pineapples and other crops for sale).

Another element of the strategy was to try to ensure people found incentive to protect/conservate the forest in the forest reserves. *This was to be accomplished by:*

1. Ensuring local people benefitted from the existence of these reserves. This was to be accomplished in several ways, through: a) JFM agreements that would permit local people to extract resources such as fuelwood, medicinal plants, and timber from the Nyandinduma production forest reserve, b) improving the condition of the degraded Nyandinduma production forest so that extraction of timber would be more profitable.
2. Ensuring local people felt ownership of the forest. This was to be accomplished through JMAs which indicate the local people are responsible for managing the forest together with the government. JMAs involve establishment of VNRCs that include patrol teams which have the responsibility to regularly patrol the Nyandinduma production forest as well as certain boundary areas of the most distant UNR. If poachers or others illegally extracting resources from the reserve were found, VNRCs could keep some part of the fines assessed. This enhanced the sense of ownership by local people.
3. Appreciating the forest more by learning more about the importance of the forest and how the health of the forest is ultimately tied to some extent with their own.

Lesson: This was a good approach. Had the project successfully implemented all aspects of the approach, the impact on the forest would almost surely have been felt. Delays during the first three years of the project had a negative impact on the Uluguru component's ability to achieve its objective. Even more important than the time factor, critical barriers including lack of agreed benefit-sharing guidelines, and a less-than-optimum choice of target forest (Nyandinduma) did not permit the project to advance as far as anticipated on JFM. A more rigorous and impact-oriented monitoring system, with a focus on the ultimate desired impact on the forest, would have also been helpful.

Conclusion: Sustainability of some of the project's achieved outcomes is threatened by lack of secured financial resources. Efforts described previously in this report are underway to secure financing that would permit some of the activities to continue but none of these are immediately available. One of the key anticipated sources of financing to continue and build on initiatives started by the project, the EAMCEF, was severely hit by the 2008 global economic crisis. The funding it received from the World Bank ended in December 2009 at a time at which EAMCEF had not yet been able to attract funding from other sources. According to the Secretariat of the EAMCEF, this scenario puts EAMCEF at a very bad financial position and uncertain future sustainability. Further support to the EAMCEF from UNDP, GEF, GOT and other stakeholders is required so that the CMEAMF project activities and outcomes can be sustained in the long run.

Conclusion: Some **good models** were developed by the project. One such model is the partnership approach adopted by this Nationally-Executed (NEX) project. The Government of Tanzania (through FBD, the Executing Agency for the project) partnered with NGOs (both national, including TFCG and WCST, and international, including CARE International); academic institutions (Sokoine University of Agriculture in Morogoro and the University of Dar es Salaam); District Councils and village governments; other projects and complementary initiatives (UMADEF, CEPF), and invited international technical support as needed through the contracting of Technical Advisors. This is the first NEX project in Tanzania to adopt such a participatory partnership approach and sets an important precedent, as well as providing an important experience and lessons. There is already evidence that the model will be replicated, although perhaps not with such diverse partners. The new "Extending the Coastal Forest Protected Area Subsystem in Tanzania" project which will be Nationally Executed (by FBD) will also establish partnerships with WWF and others. Another positive aspect of the partnership approach was the associations formed with other organizations working on conservation issues outside the project. An MOU signed with CEPF, for example, allowed the project to plan some actions in collaboration with that \$7 million investment for the Eastern Arc and lowland forests in Kenya and Tanzania, agreeing on how to share resources and get the best value for money from surveys, monitoring, and field conservation projects. This resulted in a lot of synergy. The same is also broadly true of the work with the EAMCEF, where partnerships and synergies between the two benefitted both and enhanced the long-term existence of the EAMCEF (buildings maintained, website developed, data collected for library, comments and inputs made to EAMCEF documents). Another good model was the outreach effort made by the project to try to secure additional funding during the project life to complement and sometimes amplify its own efforts. In addition to the agreement with CEPF, the project was instrumental in raising both government funds for compensation related to relocating people as well as raising external funds via WCST from the World Land Trust for reforestation in the Bunduki corridor. It also helped raise around US\$ 3 million for compensation payments and for the undertaking of the relocation process in the Derema corridor in the East Usambaras (successfully reaching out to the EU, the Global Conservation Fund, the Government of Finland, the World Bank and the CEPF through WWF). These efforts are helping to reconnect forests in key mountain blocks of the EAMs.

The model was not perfect. It took significant time to work out some of the glitches (many project activities did not begin in earnest until after the MTE), but by project end the partnership was working fairly well, although still not perfectly. The main defect being that the project, which has two components, was in many ways managed as two separate projects rather than as a single project with several components.

Another **good model** was the PMC composition, which included government representation from not only the Regional level but also the District level. Although other UNDP projects in

Tanzania have included local-level government participation on their PMCs, this has been through the office of the Regional Administrative Secretary (RAS) which has only indirectly represented Districts. This is the first UNDP-supported project in Tanzania to involve District representation on the PMC. By involving them on the PMC, they not only were able to keep up to date on what was happening in the project, but their buy-in was much greater, enhancing prospects for incorporating elements of the conservation strategy into their District Development plans.

Conclusion: The joint design of this project together with the World Bank/GEF project, which established the Eastern Arc Mountains Conservation Endowment Fund (EAMCEF), was strategic and also helped promote country ownership as the Government and other key country stakeholders perceived the initiative not merely as a five-year project, but rather as the beginning of something that would continue well beyond project end with financing from the Endowment Fund. It has since become clear that available financing from the Fund is not sufficient to support the uninterrupted continuation of many CMEAMF activities as the EAMCEF has unfortunately not yet achieved its financial goals. Nevertheless, the expectation is that the Fund will continue to grow and so be able to finance additional activities in future in line with the conservation strategy developed by this project. This will, of course, depend on whatever much-needed additional financing can be secured. In addition, the mere existence of this permanent Fund is a powerful message that the Government views its commitment to the conservation of the EAMs as a long-term one, independent of any donor-funded projects that may exist now or in future. Although the functioning of the EAMCEF itself is outside the purview of this evaluation, there are certain aspects of the EAMCEF that do form part of this evaluation, including how the Fund affects the sustainability of this project's outcomes, the success of the UNDP/GEF project activity to help secure funding for the EAMCEF, and how the conservation strategy developed by this project has helped guide the investments of the Fund.

Conclusion: **Country ownership** of the project and of the project outcomes is strong, enhancing prospects for sustainability. The project is properly housed within a Government office (a pre-existing office building complex of FBD that was improved with support from the project and the Endowment Fund and now houses the newly established Nature Reserves Centre of FBD and the Endowment Fund office). There is no separate Project Implementation Unit (PIU) as is often the case for GEF and other projects (although the Uluguru component is in essence managed in this way). The full integration of the project within the FBD is a result of the insistence of the first Project Coordinator (PC) that the project be undertaken with existing staff as much as possible. This greatly enhanced ownership and institutional aspects of sustainability but also resulted in slow progress in some areas. Nevertheless, the assessment of the TET is that it was a wise decision for the project, although a compromise (as described later in this report) may have helped guarantee country ownership as well as more timely progress.

Conclusion: The project had a number of important achievements. Some **key achievements** include:

- ✚ Significant enlargement of the forest area in the Eastern Arc Mountains (EAMs) under enhanced legal protection status. Four Forest Reserves covering a total area of 178,503 ha were upgraded to the status of Nature Reserves. An additional 4 forest reserves, covering a total area of 81,879 ha, are in various stages (mostly advanced stages) of being gazetted as Nature Reserves. Three forest reserves proposed for gazettement have been gazetted, totalling an area of 3,019 ha and five others are at an advanced stage in the gazettement process (another one is at an early stage and one has failed).

65 forest reserves were classified according to the IUCN protected area classification system and these were subsequently accepted by UNEP-WCMC and added into the World PA database. A nomination application to classify an area encompassing 8 Nature Reserves<sup>7</sup> (several of which were legally established as NRs as a direct result of this project) and one National Park in the EAMs as a World Heritage Site was completed and submitted to the UNESCO World Heritage Convention Secretariat for consideration. If successful, this would enhance the legal protection status of an additional 450,000 ha.

- ✦ Significant increase in the number of Government personnel attached to Nature and Forest Reserves. Over the project life, and in particular during the last two years, the number of staff in Nature and Forest Reserves has increased dramatically. Since the project began, there are 93 new foresters employed in the Nature Reserves. A total of 200 new Assistant Foresters were employed by FBD, and 153 more will be added next year (for both forest and wildlife). Staffing in Nature Reserves has increased by 472 % from a total of 25 staff for all NRs<sup>8</sup> at the beginning of the project to the current total of 118.
- ✦ A Nature Reserves Centre has been established in the FBD (in Morogoro) as a direct result of this project. The Government created the Centre in 2008 and has increased the number of staff over the project life to the current level of 4 and will increase this by another 3 during the next fiscal year.
- ✦ The Government has established a budget code for Nature Reserves in its national budget.
- ✦ A good deal more information of good quality exists now on the forests and biodiversity of the EAMs and on the conservation status of many elements of this biodiversity compared to what existed at the outset of the project.
- ✦ A conservation strategy for the whole of the EAMs has been developed and this was done in a participatory way which has the added benefit of encouraging a participatory approach to further strategy development. The strategy is being used by the Endowment Fund to guide its financial support decisions.
- ✦ A better understanding of the threats to the forests and to the biodiversity contained therein exists now compared to what existed at the outset of the project.
- ✦ Some strategies for addressing the key threats have been developed and consensualized with diverse stakeholders.
- ✦ A Biodiversity Conservation Strategy and a Protected Areas strategy were developed.
- ✦ The awareness level regarding the importance of the forests and biodiversity of the EAMs has increased in central, regional, district and village government entities and in local communities.

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<sup>7</sup> Some declared, some proposed.

<sup>8</sup> In those cases where what are now classified as Nature Reserves were CFR or other types of forest reserves, the figures relate to staffing in those areas in 2004.

- ✦ The concept and practice of operating as a group has been successfully introduced into many villages where villagers had no previous group experience of any kind. This significantly enhances prospects for sustainability of some project outcomes.
- ✦ 73 Village Savings and Loans (VS&L) were established by the project in the project area and another 33 were self-established outside the project area, indicating strong replicability of the model promoted by the project. The establishment of VS&Ls has enhanced the well-being of villagers in some villages bordering and nearby to the UNR.
- ✦ Community capacity related to sustainable agricultural land management and financial management has been enhanced through the training of Paraprofessionals and Community-Based Trainers (CBTs).
- ✦ An effective capacity-building strategy was implemented as part of the VS&L activity and can be replicated not only in other VS&Ls but also in other activities that involve building capacity. This strategy differs significantly from the conventional approach adopted by many projects of building capacity primarily through workshops.
- ✦ Important groundwork was done that facilitated forest carbon work in Tanzania. Until the project contracted the Edinburgh Centre for Carbon to work on carbon baselines and changes in the EAMs, no one had undertaken this type of work in Tanzania. Now, four years later, there is a great deal of interest in carbon in the country, and some of the people working on the issue were first exposed to it through the project's work.

Conclusion: There are some **promising project initiatives that have not yet reached a level of maturity that would help ensure their sustainability and ultimate impact**, thus although positive and promising, the project is leaving these initiatives prematurely, at a stage at which the potential for positive impact may or may not be realized. These include:

- ✦ Joint management of Nature Reserves.
- ✦ Most Districts in the project area have not yet had sufficient time after the “roll out” of the strategy to develop strategies of their own, incorporating new budget lines for conservation and allocating funds for this purpose. This is not to indicate that time alone is the deciding factor in whether or not Districts will do so, but in this case it was indeed a limiting factor.
- ✦ A Community-Based Organization (CBO) was formed in the Uluguru mountains in order for the existing groups to have a legal entity to sustain the conservation development initiatives started under the project. This initiative seems promising, but was so recently formed that there is no basis for judging its impact as of the time of this evaluation.
- ✦ The Environment Clubs initiated by the project seem promising, but they have not reached a level of maturity, with capacity and materials of their own, to be able to perceive an impact as of yet. The poor condition of some of the schools which these clubs are associated with is detrimental to prospects for their success as children cannot be expected to be highly motivated when they have no desks, no chairs, no materials, and a building which can hardly be defined as a shelter from the weather.
- ✦ Some income generating activities connected with forests, such as beekeeping, are promising, but only very recently begun, and no honey had yet been produced by the

time of this evaluation. The beekeeping projects were started with support from the Germany Climate Change Initiative with the objective of supporting communities displaced from the Bunduki corridor.

Conclusion: Some **activities were not as effective as expected** including:

- ✦ JFM in production forests. The production forest on which the project focused its only JFM effort, the Nyandinduma production forest reserve, has very little if any potential for timber production anytime soon (it is highly degraded), has no importance in terms of global or national biodiversity, has little or no value as a water catchment, and provides few if any opportunities for benefit sharing (even once benefit sharing guidelines are agreed by central government) for the four villages participating in the JFM. There is basically no link to conservation or to water catchment and even though the VNRC has agreed to patrol the forest for illegal activities while they wait a minimum of five years before they can begin to harvest timber, and until such a time as a Joint Management Agreement (JMA) can be signed (once government approves benefit sharing guidelines), the main incentive for these villagers to spend their time and energy doing so appears to be the boots and raincoats promised to them (and for which their feet were measured more than 6 months ago without delivery of these as of the time of the TE). The VNRCs also benefited from cross visits for VNRC members to the Kilolo district to learn about other VNRC experiences. Joint patrol teams between the communities and CFP are anticipated to continue to operate after the project. Overall, although there have been some limited benefits to the communities involved, this “model” of JFM may turn out to be more detrimental than not having any JFM model at all in the project area if communities continue to invest more than what they get out of their investment.
- ✦ JFM in Nature Reserves. (More on this later in the report.)
- ✦ Income-Generating Activities (IGAs). These were mostly not linked to the forest in any way. They are mostly activities to enhance productivity of traditional agricultural crops such as bananas and pineapples, livestock, fish farms, etc.. There was little innovation, although some good results in terms of community buy-in and generation of income.
- ✦ Biological monitoring system. Not much was done in terms of biological monitoring after the initial baseline surveys were conducted. There appears to be a low probability of sustaining biological monitoring throughout the EAMs after project end although in the case of at least one FR, the UNR, follow-up on biological monitoring is anticipated.
- ✦ Impact monitoring and end line situation. Not enough effort was put into either impact monitoring or assessing the end line situation. Even though according to comments made on the draft of this report, the project has conducted an internal end line survey where some impact outcomes data can now be obtained, this evaluation is based on a certain point in time (the time of the evaluation mission) and on information available at that point in time. It is not possible for a TET to continuously include new data as it becomes available, even after the end of the evaluation visit.

Conclusion: Some **areas could have benefited from increased attention** including:

- ✦ Addressing root causes of the destruction and degradation of EAM forests. Regarding the important issue of population growth in some of the EAM blocks, including in the Ulugurus where the population growth rate in the area is estimated at 3.6% *per annum*,

the project through support from UNDP/TZ may have, for example, proposed that Government consider requesting UNFPA to engage there in certain activities supporting implementation of the Government's efforts and thereby also enhancing UN "delivery as one".

- ✦ Exploring partnerships for enhancing sustainability and management effectiveness of some Nature Reserves. (Build on the model of FBD and TANAPA for wildlife poaching in Kilombero NR, for example.)
- ✦ Exit strategy development. A formal exit strategy was prepared for the Uluguru component but not for the strategy component. The exit strategy for the strategy component was to mainstream everything under Nature Reserves / World Heritage Unit, EAMCEF, NGO programmes and Districts. The aim, very correctly, was not to have an actual end to the work but rather for it to continue as mainstreamed activities. This is a good exit strategy but it would have been best to elaborate it in a detailed exit strategy document to be shared and discussed at a PMC and accompanied by a detailed exit plan (the exit does not refer to the work but to the project itself, thus even when work will continue after a project ends, it is good to detail exactly what will continue, by whom, with what funding, etc..) The Uluguru component exit strategy was developed in 2008. This makes sense. It is a good practice to elaborate an exit strategy well before project end, but it is best practice to revisit and revise closer to project end. This was not done.
- ✦ Greater attention to ensuring that the poorest sector of local community populations also participates and benefits from VS&Ls.

Conclusion: Some **problems were experienced by the project** including:

- ✦ Overly ambitious expectations for the budget and time frame assigned for the project (design issue).
- ✦ There were gaps in time during which the project had no PC. There was a gap of approximately 4 months without a PC when the first PC left to assume another position (now Director of Forests, FBD). There was another time gap of approximately the same length after the sudden death of the second PC. (combination of unforeseeable circumstances and inadequate government response and management support to address these once they happened)
- ✦ There was slow progress during the first three years of the project due to several reasons including the decision of the PC not to employ anyone other than one Technical Advisor for the strategy component. Thus, even though the ProDoc had envisaged contracting a Project Officer and a M&E expert, it was only the PC and the Technical Advisor who worked on the strategy elements. The reasoning of the PC was good, he did not want to create a parallel structure but rather insisted that the project be implemented with existing staff. This helps ensure ownership and sustainability as well as capacity building and is considered to be the best approach but should not compromise the project's ability to achieve its objectives. In the case of this project, this approach may have worked better given a longer project timeframe, but the reality is that the threats to the EAM forests do not allow for the luxury of time, and it may have been a good compromise to contract some additional people to be able to deal with the workload effectively, ensuring that a conventional PIU was not established but rather that these additional people were fully integrated into the FBD. Personality conflicts,

which appear to have been resolved after the MTE, also caused delays. (project management issue)

- ✦ Managing the project as two separate but related initiatives instead of a single project with several components. The CARE component was in fact managed more in the traditional PIU sense and the impression of the TET is that the PC basically assumed responsibility for the strategy component and left the responsibility for the Uluguru component to CARE even if all project funds were channelled through the government. A more effective arrangement would have been for both components to be under the effective management of the PC, not just formally but in reality. (project management issue)
- ✦ There were some problems with functioning of several Committees including a less-than-ideal functioning of the project steering committee (called the Project Management Committee or PMC) which only met 7 times, in one case leaving a gap of 21 months between meetings. In addition, some other technical and coordinating committees established early on by the project ceased to function altogether. (project governance issue)

Conclusion: Some **critical barriers** exist which affect prospects for project success, sustainability and replicability. A single project, cannot and should not try “to do it all”, but unlike many other more conventional UNDP-supported projects, GEF biodiversity projects are specifically tasked with being strategic interventions that address underlying threats and critical barriers to the conservation of biodiversity. Some of the critical barriers which the TET observed include:

- ✦ Lack of agreement on benefit sharing arrangements. “While several hundred villages have been supported to develop JMAs ...only a limited number of these have been signed by the government—particularly those relating to NFRs. This is largely because of the fact that the law remains silent on how the benefits of forest management—particularly in forest reserves managed for timber production purposes – can be equitably shared with participating communities. In many cases, benefit-sharing arrangements remain in a legal limbo – with de facto management at the local level taking place in return for vague promises about benefits at a later date. Clearly, this is a situation that cannot be sustained indefinitely. Without benefits reaching a level that equal or exceed the costs being borne, in terms of local forest management, the long term future of JFM remains uncertain.” (From Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania: Lessons Learned and Experiences to Date, T. Blomley and S. Iddi, Sept, 2009)
- ✦ Lack of implementation of the government’s policy to relocate people from the EAMs to other less environmentally-sensitive areas. Nine billion TSHs were committed by the Government in March, 2006 for, amongst other things, relocation of people from the mountains through the “National Strategy for Urgent Action on Land Degradation and Conservation of Water Catchment Areas” (MKAKATI), but with little success.
- ✦ Population growth rate in some of the EAM blocks, including the Uluguru Mountains, the pilot area of this project. Although this is acknowledged as an important underlying threat to many (but not all) of the EAM forests by the GOT and others, very little is being done to address this underlying cause of many of the direct threats to the EAM forests. Lack of addressing this issue makes it much more difficult to achieve expected project

outcomes and negatively affects the prospects for sustaining positive outcomes achieved by the project. When key stakeholders were asked what the population growth rate is either overall in the EAMs or in any area within the EAMs, no one was able to provide even an estimate, an indicator of the lack of attention to this important issue. There are many activities such as enhanced educational opportunities for girls, activities to enhance awareness within local communities about the impact of population growth on natural resources they depend upon and on farm size trends, and other activities which have been shown to have impacts on population growth rates, which from the TET's discussions with Government representatives at central, District and village levels would be welcomed.

- ✚ Infrastructure and market links to enable effective income generation from IGAs undertaken by communities nearby to forests.

Conclusion: There were some **opportunities missed by the project** including:

- ✚ Support to those Districts intent on implementing the Government's policy to relocate people from the mountains. The project might have done more to support the government's efforts in finding solutions to relocate people especially from the designated corridor areas focusing on those Districts such as Morogoro Rural District where the District Commissioner is intent on implementing the policy.
- ✚ Support to remove the barrier presented by the lack of government-approved benefit sharing guidelines associated with JFM. It might well be argued that because this was supposed to be done by the much-larger TFCMP project, this project should not have dealt with the issue. Nevertheless, it could have been a subject of much greater weight during the project formulation/negotiation stage especially as GEF projects should work to remove critical barriers and these should take place within a conducive policy and legislative framework.
- ✚ Opportunity to introduce some measures that may help address one important underlying root cause of forest degradation, population growth rate in certain mountain blocks of the EAMs.

#### Recommendation Regarding Future UNDP Support to Conservation Initiatives in Tanzania

Although project evaluations should normally steer away from making any recommendations regarding future funding, because this TET was specifically asked by UNDP to provide our thoughts on whether UNDP/TZ should continue to be involved in supporting conservation-related projects or if, given UNDP's efforts to streamline ("do less and do it better"), limited resources would better be spent elsewhere. Although the TET cannot assign relative priority to conservation-related projects compared with other projects UNDP may support, it is abundantly clear that there is a great need for continued support to conservation initiatives in Tanzania and that almost all aspects of development ultimately depend on a sound environment. In the case of Tanzania, national and local revenues and livelihoods earned from forests, wildlife and other natural elements are critically important to its development. The TET cannot imagine a more strategic area for UNDP support and believes that UNDP is well placed to offer such continued support to assist Tanzania with its conservation initiatives.